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Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the
Undue Burden Standard
Khiara M. Bridges∗
Abstract
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 the
Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework, first articulated nineteen
years earlier in Roe v. Wade,2 with a new test for determining the
constitutionality of abortion regulations—the "undue burden standard."3
The Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart4 was its most recent
occasion to use the undue burden standard, as the Court was called upon to
ascertain the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a
federal statute proscribing certain methods of performing second- and
third-trimester abortions.5 A majority of the Court held that the regulation
was constitutionally permissible, finding that it did not impose an undue
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston
University. Ph.D. (anthropology), Columbia University; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A.,
Spelman College. Thanks to Pamela Bridgewater, Ariela Dubler, Katherine Franke,
Suzanne Goldberg, Henry Monaghan, Carol Sanger, Anna Marie Smith, Kendall Thomas, as
well as participants in the Gender and Sexuality Law Program’s 2009 Colloquium at
Columbia Law School, for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are also owed to the
Center for Reproductive Rights and Columbia Law School for providing financial support
during the writing of this Article.
1. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding
a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect that right).
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a state may regulate areas protected by
this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and
protecting fetal life).
3. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
4. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 163–64 (2007) (finding the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act constitutional because the state’s interests in protecting the dignity
of "the life within the woman" and the "dignity and reputation" of doctors who perform
partial-birth abortions outweighed the need for maintaining the availability of the intact
dilation and evacuation (intact D&E) procedure).
5. See id. at 155 (assessing the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act).
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burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.6 In order to
determine why it is that the undue burden standard has been incapable of
striking down laws that limit a woman’s ability to elect an abortion, this
Article conducts a close reading of Carhart. The close reading reveals
Carhart to be, at base, a logically sound opinion; however, its primary and
fundamental weakness is that it proceeds from a highly problematic and
disputed assumption—namely, that the fetus is a morally–consequential
entity. It is this magnificently undecided presupposition that forms the
basis of the Carhart majority’s argument that abortion harms women,7 a
contention for which the decision has gained notoriety. Furthermore, the
undue burden standard has come to reflect this presupposition inasmuch as
the standard, too, presupposes the inherent "life" and moral value of the
fetus. As such, this Article argues that the undue burden standard has
become ineffective because, built into it at present, are assumptions about
the always already valuable "life" of the fetus that, in any given instance,
overdetermine the questions that the Court asks when weighing the
constitutionality of a regulation that limits abortion by protecting fetal
"life." When the standard presupposes the existence of a valuable fetal
"life," it is likely that any legislation aimed at protecting that "life" will
pass constitutional muster. The Article attempts to rehabilitate the
standard by proposing an "agnostic undue burden standard"—that is, an
undue burden standard that proceeds from the assumption that the moral
status of the fetus is not known. The agnostic undue burden standard would
ensure that the state corrupts neither the pregnant woman’s ability to
contemplate the moral status of the fetus that she carries nor her ability to
contemplate whether the moral status so accorded should affect her
decision to continue her pregnancy. If reconceptualized in the way that this
Article proposes, an undue burden might be thought to reference those
measures that impose upon the woman a conception of the inherent, moral
value of fetal life—in derogation of her own personal views concerning
fetal life, or in derogation of whether she believes that those views should
determine the trajectory that her pregnancy takes.

6. See id. ("The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we reject
this further facial challenge to its validity.").
7. See id. at 159–60 ("It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know . . . .").
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I. Introduction
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 the
Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework, first articulated nineteen
years earlier in Roe v. Wade,9 with a new test for determining the
constitutionality of abortion regulations—the "undue burden standard."10
The Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart11 was its most recent
8. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding
a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect that right).
9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a state may regulate areas protected by
this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and
protecting fetal life).
10. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 ("To protect the central right recognized by Roe v.
Wade while at the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential life,
we will employ the undue burden analysis."); see also id. ("An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.").
11. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 163–64 (2007) (finding the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act constitutional because the state’s interests in protecting the dignity
of "the life within the woman" and the "dignity and reputation" of doctors who perform
partial-birth abortions outweighed the need for maintaining the availability of the intact
dilation and evacuation (intact D&E) procedure).
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occasion to use the undue burden standard, as the Court was called upon to
ascertain the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a
federal statute proscribing certain methods of performing second- and thirdtrimester abortions.12 In a fascinating opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
a majority of the Court held that the regulation was constitutionally
permissible, finding that it did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy.13
Carhart reveals that the undue burden standard, as currently
formulated, is incapable of defending the abortion right from being
diminished by incrementalist legislation.14 The first aim of this Article is to
identify, precisely, the features of the undue burden standard that make it
ineffective protection of the abortion right;15 the second aim of the paper is
to rehabilitate the standard by excising those problematic features and
proposing a model that better accords with Casey and U.S. Constitutional
12. See id. at 141 ("Any physician who knowingly performs a partial birth abortion
and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV))).
13. See id. (finding that the "Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle").
14. In her concurrence in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down a similar statute
criminalizing certain methods of performing second and third trimester abortions, Justice
Ginsburg described such bans as incrementalist methods designed to enervate the abortion
right. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Citing a
dissenting opinion written by Judge Posner, Justice Ginsburg noted that the criminalization
of the abortion method at issue was "‘not because the procedure kills the fetus, not because it
risks worse complications for the woman than alternative procedures would do, not because
it is a crueler or more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a pregnancy.’" Id. at
951–52 (citations omitted). Instead, she writes, "the law prohibits the procedure because the
State legislators seek to chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v. Wade, even as
modified by Casey." Id. at 952.
Siegel offers an excellent exploration of Carhart as the product of an antiabortion
social movement motivated by the belief that seeking a gradual diminishment of the abortion
right, as opposed to seeking an outright ban, would be the more successful political strategy.
See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1707–12 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity]. Siegel
noted that "the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was of a piece with prevailing antiabortion
strategy," as the movement, faced with lack of popular support for the Human Life
Amendment, "began to develop strategies to reverse Roe incrementally, through legislation
and litigation that would erode support for abortion one step at a time." Id. at 1709. Siegel
also discusses how the incrementalist strategy has produced major rifts in the antiabortion
movement. See id. at 1709–10 n.51 (quoting one antiabortion advocate who called
incrementalism the "devil’s work" and emphasized that each "cleverly crafted incremental
legislative initiative[] ends with a tiny unspoken caveat: ‘. . . and then you can kill the
baby’").
15. See infra Part II.A–III (describing the problems with the current undue burden
standard).
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law.16 The argument, then, is not that the undue burden standard is
inherently incapable of defending the abortion right from being weakened.17
Rather, the argument is that, in its current formulation, the undue burden
standard is unable to preserve what is still recognized within constitutional
law as an important, if not a fundamental, right; accordingly, the standard
must be reconfigured if it is to provide the protection that women need and
the Constitution demands.
In order to identify the source of the undue burden standard’s current
weakness, I undertake a close reading of Carhart and analyze the operation
of the undue burden standard within the majority opinion.18 This
investigation reveals Carhart to be, at base, a logically sound opinion;
however, its primary and fundamental weakness is that it proceeds from a
highly problematic and disputed assumption—namely, that the fetus is a
morally consequential entity. Specifically, the opinion in Carhart is written
as if the majority knows that the fetus has/is an inherently valuable
"life"19—as if the moral status of the fetus has been decided.20 It is this
16. See infra Part III (suggesting revisions to the current standard).
17. See infra Part IV.A (explaining how a revised undue burden standard would
operate effectively).
18. See infra Part II (providing a close analysis of Carhart).
19. I use quotations around the word "life" when I am not using the term to signify the
(relatively) morally neutral capacity possessed by living biological organisms. The
quotation marks index a reference to the "life" that has moral, theological, and/or spiritual
significance—a notion of "life" that some believe is simultaneous to the biological life of the
living organism. See infra Part II.B (discussing the conflation of biological life with moral
life).
20. It is important to note at the outset that I assume that the position that the Court
has taken regarding the fetus is an entirely moral position—as opposed to a religious or
theological position. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the debate
surrounding whether the view that the fetus is morally consequential should always be
understood as a religious position or whether it could also be understood as a purely moral
position). Furthermore, I assume that, although this position may be informed by religion or
theology, it remains capable of being described as a secular and moral position. Justice
White has articulated eloquently the secular basis for concluding that the fetus is a morally
significant entity:
[O]ne must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its
cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species homo
sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from all others,
and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or,
indeed, an adult human being . . . .
[T]he continued existence and
development—that is to say, the life—of such an entity are so directly at stake in
the woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy . . . .
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
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magnificently undecided (and potentially undecidable) presupposition that
forms the basis of the Carhart majority’s argument that abortion harms
women,21 a contention for which the decision has gained notoriety.22
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, asserted the simple truth of this
argument: "[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow."23 However, the
argument that abortion harms women rests on the presupposition that the
fetus is a morally consequential entity of the highest degree. Furthermore,
the undue burden standard in Carhart reflects this presupposition inasmuch
as the standard, too, presupposes the inherent "life" and moral value of the
fetus.24 As such, this Article argues that the undue burden standard is
ineffective because, built into it at present, are assumptions about the
always already valuable "life" of the fetus that, in any given instance,
overdetermine the questions that the Court asks when weighing the
constitutionality of a regulation that protects fetal "life."25 When the
21. In arguing that abortion harms women, the Court states:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns,
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a
child assuming the human form.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
22. See infra note 36 (discussing several commentators’ criticism of the Court’s
conclusion that abortion harms women).
23. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. Justice Ginsberg, writing in dissent, disputes the
facticity of the claim that abortion harms women as well as indicates its origin in
antiabortion social movements. See id. at 158 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court
invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence:
Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from
‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.’"). Reva Siegel offers a helpful compendium of
studies disproving any innate link between induced abortion and psychological damage or
trauma. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1653 n.44 (2008)
[hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s Reasons] (listing several such studies); see also id. at 1668–
73 (describing how the abortion-harms-women argument was developed strategically and
deployed by an anti-abortion social movement seeking to present itself as concerned with the
woman as much as it was concerned with the fetus and, in so doing, to build its base of
supporters); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 14, at 1726–33 (demonstrating how the antiabortion
movement has advanced the claim "not only that women will be harmed by abortion but that
they have been pushed into abortions they do not want and misled into abortions they will
regret").
24. See infra Part II.B (explaining Carhart’s understanding of the value of "life").
25. See infra Part III (describing how the notion of "life" corrupts the undue burden
standard).
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standard presupposes the existence of a valuable fetal "life," it is likely that
any legislation aimed at protecting that "life" will pass constitutional
muster.
As a solution to this predicament, this Article proposes that the
assumption that the moral status of the fetus is known and that the Supreme
Court knows it can be replaced by a skepticism towards the knowability of
this question.26 Likewise, the undue burden standard should be similarly
ambivalent towards the question of whether the fetus is/has a "life." The
skepticism that I propose would counsel that the undue burden standard
should assume that the moral status of the fetus is not known (and may not
ever be known). I refer to the latter formulation as the "agnostic" version of
the undue burden standard. I propose that an agnosticism towards the
question of fetal life will revitalize the undue burden standard, thereby
enabling it to competently protect the abortion right from further
diminishment. The agnostic undue burden standard that I propose would
ensure that there exists a space around the abortion decision wherein a
woman would be free to decide whether and when over the course of her
pregnancy she will grant the fetus a consequential moral status, and if so,
whether she will allow the moral status so granted to determine the
trajectory of her pregnancy. The agnostic undue burden standard would
create conditions within which a moral pluralism could develop around the
fetus and abortion, more generally. Differently stated, a space of moral
pluralism should surround the exercise of a right as important as the
abortion right; it is this space that a morally neutral—indeed, an agnostic—
undue burden standard patrols.
Part II conducts a close reading of Carhart, placing the argument that
abortion harms women within the larger conceptual apparatus erected by
Congress and affirmed by the Court in its review of the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act. This Part reveals that the foundational assumption upon
which the majority’s logic rests is the presupposition that the moral status
of the fetus is objectively knowable and, further, that the Court knows it.
Part III continues the discussion by exploring how the Court’s confidence
with regard to the moral status of the fetus—that is, that the fetus is a
morally consequential "life"—has been incorporated into the undue burden
standard. This Part argues that such an incorporation overdetermines the
questions that the Court asks with the standard, making the standard
incapable of defending the abortion right from being diminished by fetal
"life"-protective measures. This Part goes on to describe an alternative
26.

See infra Part III (suggesting a new undue burden standard).

922

67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010)

undue burden standard that does not proceed with the same assumptions
regarding the fetus’s moral status. This alternative standard, the agnostic
undue burden standard, would ensure that the state does not corrupt the
woman’s ability to decide for herself what moral status her fetus has and
the consequences thereof. Part IV describes the agnostic undue burden
standard in action—demonstrating how it would be used to adjudicate the
constitutionality of several fetal "life"-protective laws that have been, or
may be, passed by various states. A brief conclusion follows in Part V.
II. A Close Reading of Carhart
In Carhart, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003" [PBA], a
federal statute that prohibited second- and third-trimester "intact D&E"
procedures27 by imposing criminal sanctions on physicians using the
method.28 The immediate precursor to Carhart was the Court’s decision in
27. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007) (explaining the history of the
Act and the previous decisions on abortion). "Dilation and evacuation" procedures are most
commonly used to perform abortions taking place after the first trimester. Most first
trimester abortions are accomplished with a vacuum aspiration procedure, during which the
physician empties the contents of the uterus with a suctioning device. See Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2004) (noting that ninety percent of all abortions take place in
the first trimester and that the most predominant method for first trimester abortions is
"vacuum aspiration").
28. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 141. The most relevant provisions of the statute, cited in
Carhart are the following:
(a) Any physician who . . . knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 2 years, or both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion
that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, . . .
(b) As used in this section—
(1) the term ‘partial-birth abortion’ means an abortion in which the person
performing the abortion—
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the
case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the
mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the
navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt
act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and
(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the
partially delivered living fetus; . . .
....
(e) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be
prosecuted under this section . . . .
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Stenberg v. Carhart;29—a case in which the Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that similarly
prohibited certain methods of second- and third-trimester abortions. The
Court in Stenberg struck down the statute, finding that the legislation was
unconstitutional both because it lacked a health exception and because it
unduly burdened the abortion right due to its effective proscription of most
second- and third-trimester abortion procedures.30 In Carhart, the Court
was asked to consider a revised version of the statute at issue in Stenberg,
which included language that defined the criminalized procedure to a
greater level of specificity than its Stenberg predecessor.31
Carhart held that the statute was constitutional—finding that it
"further[ed] the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life
of the fetus that may become a child."32 Moreover, the Court found that the
criminalization of this specific type of abortion procedure did not unduly
burden a woman’s abortion right because the proscription "expresses

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)). Nonintact, or standard, D&E procedures
differ from the intact D&E insofar as the physician does not attempt to extract the fetus
intact from the uterus, instead, the physician dismembers the fetus and removes it from the
woman’s body in parts. See id. at 135–36 (describing the nonintact, or standard, D&E
procedure).
29. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914, 945–46 (finding a similar Nebraska abortion statute
unconstitutional).
30. Id. at 938, 945–46 (finding the statute unconstitutional for these reasons).
31. The Nebraska statute defined a partial-birth abortion as:
[A]n abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and
completing the delivery. For purposes of this subdivision, the term partially
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child means
deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or
a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the
person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill
the unborn child.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326 (1998).
32. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 146. Against the charge that the statute was void for
vagueness, the Court responded that the language in the federal Act, unlike the Nebraska
statute, clearly "define[d] the line between potentially criminal conduct on the one hand and
lawful abortion on the other." Id. at 149. Moreover, the Court found that the scienter
requirement, providing that a physician must intend to perform an intact D&E procedure,
"alleviate[d] vagueness concerns." Id. The Court also held that although the statute did not
contain a health exception, it survived constitutional scrutiny because "[t]he medical
uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health risks provides a
sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue
burden." Id. at 164.
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respect for the dignity of human life"33—a goal that, per Casey,34 the state
can pursue, although the state’s pursuit of the goal may, directly or
tangentially, burden the abortion right.35
In the process of upholding the federal PBA, the Court made the claim
for which the Carhart decision is probably most identified: abortion harms
women.36 However, this argument is part of a more elaborate conceptual
33. Id. at 157
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (noting that
abortion regulations that allow the state to "express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted").
35. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (authorizing the state to pursue
the goal of promoting respect for the dignity of human life).
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the
State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute
others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.
Id.
36. See id. at 159 (arguing that "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow" an
abortion); see also Rebecca E. Ivey, Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a
New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (2008) (noting
that the "woman-protective discourse, which arises in nascent form in the Stenberg
dissents . . . reaches its full expression in Gonzales"); Martha K. Plante, "Protecting"
Women’s Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s
Equal Right to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
389, 400 (2007) (arguing that "the Court mocked the role that a woman’s mental health plays
in the abortion decision, implying that women are not competent to make such serious
decisions and must be saved from themselves by the state and the courts"); Harper Jean
Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal
Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 121 (2008) (noting that Justice Kennedy looked
to an "amicus brief describing the discredited ‘post-abortion syndrome’" for support of the
claim that "abortion . . . by its nature [is] harmful to women"); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v.
Carhart and the Court’s "Women’s Regret" Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2008)
(arguing that Justice "Kennedy, assuming facts not in evidence, gave to abortion-rights
opponents something they have sought for a number of years—official recognition of the
women’s regret rationale"). Siegel offers an engaging genealogy of the abortion-harmswomen argument, which she calls "woman-protective abortion argument"—describing its
origins as a therapeutic discourse designed to discourage women from terminating their
immediate pregnancies and tracing its transformation into a legal and political argument
made by anti-abortion social movements that was ultimately accepted by the majority in
Carhart. See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 23, at 1643–51 (describing the
evolution of the abortion-harms-women argument). Indeed, Siegel’s academic interest in the
abortion-harms-women argument predated the Court’s decision in Carhart. In earlier
scholarship, she argued that abortion regulations that were premised on the belief that
abortion harms women violate equal protection guarantees contained in the Constitution.
See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of WomenProtective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (2007) (analyzing "the
state’s claimed interest in protecting women from abortion" showing "that these
justifications rest on gender stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s roles," and
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apparatus that begins with the logic that Congress advanced in justification
of the federal PBA.37 The next section starts the analysis there.
A. The Fetus-qua-Infant and How "Abortion Harms Women"
In the course of arguing that the state may constitutionally burden the
abortion right with laws that express "profound respect" for fetal life,
Carhart approvingly cites Congressional Findings surrounding the federal
PBA, documenting Congress’s concern with "‘drawing a bright line that
clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’"38 The Court went on to
"confirm the validity of drawing boundaries to prevent certain practices that
extinguish life and are close to actions that are condemned."39 The federal
PBA was intended to draw this boundary. The criminalization of intact
D&E procedures, which are, according to Congress, dangerously mimetic
of infanticide in a way that nonintact D&E procedures are not, is advanced
as a proper exercise of a state engaged in "promot[ing] respect for life,
including the life of the unborn."40
In order to find the federal PBA constitutional, the Carhart majority
had to legitimate the boundaries drawn by Congress, reasoning that the
lawfulness of an abortion procedure ought to be achieved by its distance
from infanticide.41 The majority’s task is to support a logic wherein the
differences between intact and nonintact D&E procedures acquire
constitutional significance—wherein one procedure approximates
infanticide so closely that its proscription remains constitutional, while the
other has such sufficient distance from infanticide that it is legitimately
untouched by the proscription of its sibling procedure.42 To accomplish this
concluding that "[e]nacting a law to compel a pregnant woman to become a mother for these
reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause").
37. See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s justification for the PBA).
38. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 157.
41. See id. at 158 ("The Court has in the past confirmed the validity of drawing
boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are
condemned.").
42. Other scholars have noted the novelty that characterizes the Carhart majority’s
attempt to find constitutional significance in the differences between intact D&E produces
and nonintact D&E procedures. One scholar has written that "the Court’s willingness to
draw sharp lines between procedures on the grounds of vague and unbounded concerns
about ‘coarsening society’ represents a novel lens through which to analyze reproductive
rights." Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories
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task, the Court had to accept Congress’s reasoning that the abortion
procedure is more like infanticide the closer the aborted fetus, or abortus,
resembles an infant when it is removed from the uterus.43 Conversely, the
less the abortus approximates an infant upon its removal from the woman’s
body, the greater the distance the procedure has from infanticide. Within
the legislature’s logic, infanticide is inflicted on infants assuming a human
form; abortions are inflicted on fetuses not assuming a human form. When
a physician purports to perform an abortion procedure on an object that
assumes the human form, the bright line between infanticide and abortion is
transgressed, and the state may legitimately proscribe the "abortion"
procedure.44
Yet, the conceptual apparatus erected by Congress in the federal PBA
and legitimated by the Court in Carhart proceeds from a problematic
assumption—that is, that the fetus is appropriately likened to an infant. To
begin, there is no fundamental justification for attaching legal significance
to the form that the abortus assumes upon its removal from the woman’s
body. When one takes as one’s point of reference the form the fetus
of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1514, 1568 (2008). She notes that this lens, a "repugnance lens," may be used to
justify severe limitations on reproductive rights. Id.
43. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) ("Congress determined that the
abortion methods it proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn
infant,’ and thus it . . . clearly distinguishe[d] abortion and infanticide." (citations omitted)).
44. There also seems to be other boundaries that are transgressed in the performance
of the intact D&E procedure—at least within the conceptual apparatus constructed by
Congress and affirmed by the Court. It would appear that, for Congress and the Carhart
majority, there are obstetricians and there are abortionists. Obstetricians deliver infants
during the process of a live birth; abortionists conduct abortions during abortion processes.
In pulling the body of the fetus into the vagina via breech extraction in the course of the
intact D&E, the abortionist acts as would an "obstetrician delivering a child." Stenberg v.
Carhart¸ 530 U.S. 914, 959 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, subsequent to the
breech extraction, which is properly performed pursuant to a live birth, the physician
aspirates the contents of the fetus’s brain and performs an abortion. In this way, the intact
D&E procedure transgresses the demarcations between live birth and abortion processes by
using the process of a live birth to conduct an abortion. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his
dissent in Stenberg, "We are referred to substantial medical authority that [the intact D&E]
perverts the natural birth process to a greater degree than [nonintact] D&E, commandeering
the live birth process until the skull is pierced." Id. at 962–63. He approvingly cites an
amicus curiae brief, which argued that the intact D&E procedure "is aberrant and troubling
because the technique confuses the disparate role of a physician in childbirth and abortion."
Id. at 963. After noting that the intact D&E procedure requires doctors to use "the natural
delivery process to kill the fetus," he concludes that the State was justified in proscribing the
procedure, as "the natural birth process has been appropriated." Id. at 964; see also Carhart,
550 U.S. at 160 (arguing that the intact D&E "perverts a process during which life is brought
into the world").
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assumes in utero, the object of the intact D&E procedure is identical to the
object of the nonintact D&E procedure. When the intact fetus being
sustained by the woman is the referent, one can appreciate that the intact
D&E procedure is no more and no less like infanticide than nonintact
D&Es.45 If one chooses to liken an in utero fetus to an infant, one can
appreciate that infanticide of this fetus-cum-infant may be accomplished by
45. The Court in Stenberg specifically made this point, arguing that "the notion that
either of these two equally gruesome procedures . . . is more akin to infanticide than the
other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one but not the other, is
simply irrational." Stenberg¸ 530 U.S. at 946–47.
It is interesting that the Court in Carhart did not consider the form that the fetus
assumes within the woman. From one angle, one could understand the Court’s refusal to
consider the fetus in utero as a rejection of visual technologies, which tend to disregard the
fact that the visualized, free-floating, seemingly autonomous fetus is being sustained by a
woman. These technologies have been roundly criticized by feminists and other scholars.
Rosalind Petchetsky makes this argument cogently:
The fetus in utero has become a metaphor for "man" in space, floating free,
attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But where is the mother in
that metaphor? She has become empty space. . . . [T]he autonomous, freefloating foetus merely extends to gestation the Hobbesian view of born human
beings as disconnected, solitary individuals. [This] abstract individualism . . .
efface[es] the pregnant woman and the foetus’ dependence on her. . . .
Rosalind Petchetsky, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, AND MEDICINE 57,
63 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987).
Insofar as the Court appears to reject the assumption of the perspective allowed by
these technologies, one could argue that the Court is assuming a feminist or woman-centered
position. However, from another angle, one could understand the Court’s refusal to consider
the fetus in utero as its acquisition of the perspective of the (likely gendered male) physician
who sees the abortus when it is removed from the woman. That is, it is the physician
performing the abortion who sees the form that the object of the procedure assumes.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy proclaims to reject this perspective in his dissent in
Stenberg. Chastising the majority for using medical terminology—such as "transcervical
procedures," "osmotic dilators," "instrumental disarticulation," and "paracervical block"—to
describe the procedure at issue, Kennedy writes that "the majority views the procedure from
the perspective of the abortionist." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In
Stenberg, Justice Kennedy argues that the majority should assume "the perspective of the
society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending human life." Id. at 957; see
also id. at 962 (noting that "abortion is fraught with consequences for . . . the persons who
perform and assist in the procedure [and for] society which must confront the knowledge
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence
against innocent human life"); cf. Ivey, supra note 36, at 1461 (reading Justice Kennedy’s
account of the intact D&E abortion procedure in Carhart as assuming the perspective of the
medical personnel, who "can see and thus internalize" the event). Accordingly, in placing
primacy on the form of the ex utero fetus assumes over the in utero fetus, it would appear
that Carhart has indeed acquired the perspective of the observing society, which may react
in horror to the form that the abortus assumes. Notably, the woman, whose body once
sustained the abortus, is also not explicitly included in this perspective.
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decapitation or the piercing of the infant’s skull (which occurs during the
intact D&E procedure), just as it may be accomplished by dismemberment
(which occurs during the nonintact D&E procedure).46 Differently stated,
the proximity to infanticide need not turn on the form the fetus assumes
after the procedure; it may just as well turn on the form the fetus assumes
before the procedure. If the latter is the point of reference, intact and
nonintact D&Es are indistinguishable in their approximation to infanticide.
Now, of course, the goal here is not to argue that Congress somehow
erred when it failed to also criminalize nonintact D&E procedures. Instead,
the point is that it is arbitrary to select the post-abortion fetus as the referent
for determining a procedure’s approximation to infanticide.47 Furthermore,
and more problematically, the Court’s acceptance of the conceptual
apparatus posited by Congress obscures that, in order for any abortion
procedure to approximate infanticide, the fetus must first be likened to an
infant. That the Court does not question whether Congress may
legitimately liken the fetus to an infant intimates towards a conclusion that I
will elaborate later: the Court is proceeding from the assumption that it
knows the moral status of the fetus and, further, that this moral status is one
of a value-possessing "life."48
Yet, the Court expands upon the conceptual apparatus offered by
Congress by inserting it into a larger ontology of motherhood; moreover,
this is a metaphysics of motherhood that leads the Court to assert that
abortion harms women. To explain: after a relatively unexceptional (if
provocative, insofar as it included graphic descriptions of the abortion
procedure at issue) discussion of the potential vagueness, overbreadth, and
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the nonintact D&E
procedure).
47. The Carhart dissent similarly recognized the arbitrariness of the Court’s decision.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued:
Delivery of an intact . . . fetus warrants special condemnation, the Court
maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant. But so,
too, does a fetus delivered intact after it is terminated by injection a day or two
before the surgical evacuation, or a fetus delivered through medical induction or
cesarean. Yet, the availability of those procedures—along with D&E by
dismemberment—the Court says, saves the ban on intact D&E from a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As indicated by the dissent, the
majority’s logic contains contradictions and inconsistencies; after Carhart, constitutional
protection will still be afforded to abortion procedures that produce aborted fetuses that
resemble infants (subsequent to digoxin-preceded intact D&E procedures as well as
abortions performed through medical inductions and cesareans).
48. See infra Part II.B (unpacking the meaning of a "value-possessing ‘life’").
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unduly burdensomeness of the federal PBA, Carhart takes a jarring, almost
inexplicable turn49 when it proclaims, "[r]espect for human life finds an
ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child."50 It is
this slightly maudlin, highly disputable,51 yet effectively vapid statement
that is the springboard for the Court’s elaboration of its ontology of life,
motherhood, and abortion.52
As discussed above, the Court accepts Congress’s reasoning that the
abortion procedure is more disrespectful of human life the closer the object
of the procedure resembles a child; accordingly, the intact D&E procedure,
with its infant-like abortus, may be criminalized because of the high level
of disrespect it shows for human life.53 Yet, the Court introduces its
discussion of the issue with avowals of the "bond of love the mother has for
her child" as the "ultimate expression" of "respect for human life."
It would appear that, for the Court, the more the object of the
procedure approximates a child, the more the woman undergoing the
abortion procedure approximates a mother, and the more disrespect is
shown human life by the procedure that would disrupt that always already
bond between mother and child. Conversely, the less the object of the
procedure approximates a child, the less the woman undergoing the
procedure approximates a mother, and the less disrespect is shown human
life by the procedure that would disrupt that bond. Following this logic,
one can then understand the significance of the Court’s conclusion that:
49. See Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 383 (2008) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s "lapse" into a
reflection on the "bond of love" between mother and child is "an unconnected and
completely unsubstantiated reflection about motherhood").
50. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
51. Indeed, the majority’s statement that "respect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child" might best be described not as
disputable, but rather as inarguable. See Turner, supra note 36, at 41 (noting that the
Court’s opinion is based on an "inarguable premise and conclusion about abortion and
‘women’"); cf. Tepich, supra note 49, at 383 (describing the Court’s statement that "respect
for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child"
as "completely without support").
52. Tepich notes that "[i]t remains a mystery to this author and to countless other
bystanders, including Justice Ginsburg, where exactly Justice Kennedy came up with these
sweeping conclusions about the nature and moral nuances of motherhood" and describes this
part of the majority opinion as a "moral meandering through the realm of motherhood."
Tepich, supra note 49, at 385.
53. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 ("Congress determined that the abortion methods it
proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’ and thus it was
concerned with ‘drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’"
(citations omitted)).
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It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing
brain on her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.54

Within the majority’s metaphysics, when the object of the procedure
approximates a child, the woman approximates motherhood; yet the Court’s
citation to the "self-evident" fact that a woman will suffer more if she learns
that her abortus resembled a child reveals that, also a part of this
metaphysics, is the belief that the more the woman approximates
motherhood, the more damage the procedure inflicts on her. Conversely,
the less the object of the procedure approximates a child, the less the
woman approximates motherhood, and as a result, the less the damage that
is inflicted by the abortion.55
Again, this conceptual apparatus proceeds from the dubious
assumption that respect for human life ought to be aligned with an abortion
procedure that produces fragments of an infant; respect for human life
could just as easily be aligned with the abortion procedure that produces an
intact fetal body.56 Moreover, it is not self-evident that a woman
approximates motherhood by the form her abortus assumes. An alternative
54. Id. at 159. Turner observes that the majority states that only "some women" regret
their decisions to abort. Turner, supra note 36, at 41. However, when the wholesale
proscription of an abortion method is based on the state’s desire to protect "some women"
from the regret that they may experience after undergoing an abortion, "the operative
meaning of ‘some women’ is, in effect, ‘all women.’" Id.
Turner goes on to note that the woman’s regret rationale may be extended to justify the
prohibition of other abortion methods—specifically, "the equally ‘brutal’ and ‘gruesome’ but
still lawful procedure of D&E by dismemberment." Id. at 41–42. He writes, "Gonzales thus
provides a judicially validated wedge for those who see and will certainly use the Court’s
decision to extend the reach of the regret rationale beyond the intact D&E setting in their
continuing effort to chip away at and ultimately achieve the interment of the Roe-Casey
legal regime." Id. at 42; see also Suter, supra note 42, at 1578 ("[I]f the goal is to protect
women from [ ] ‘severe depression and loss of self-esteem’ . . . by not permitting her to
choose how her fetus will be killed, why may it not protect her more securely by not
permitting her an abortion at all?" (quoting Ronald Dworkin, The Court & Abortion: Worse
Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 31, 2007, at 21)).
55. It should be noted that, although the question for the Court is how closely the
woman approximates motherhood, within the worldview articulated, the woman is already a
"mother" by virtue of her pregnancy; further, she remains a "mother" without regard to the
trajectory her pregnancy takes. Accordingly, the woman who has successfully terminated a
pregnancy and has come to "struggle with grief . . . and sorrow" when she learns that a
doctor "pierce[d] the skull and vacuum[ed] the fast-developing brain of her unborn child"
can still, rightfully, be referred to by the Court as a "mother."
56. This would enable the fetus to be interred, for example.
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ontology is suggested by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, where she notes
that "notwithstanding the ‘bond of love’ women often have with their
children, not all pregnancies, this Court has recognized, are wanted, or even
the product of consensual activity."57 An alternative ontology might hold
that the form the abortus assumes is irrelevant to the woman’s status as a
mother; what is relevant, on the contrary, is the wantedness of her
pregnancy and her desire to be a mother. A "mother" is not simply
identifiable by biological fiat, but rather is an identity a woman assumes—
agentively and consciously.
Yet, forming the condition of possibility for the Court’s acceptance of
the fetus-as-infant analogy and its subsequent insertion into a larger
ontology of motherhood—ultimately leading the majority to think it "selfevident" that abortion harms women—is the Court’s confidence about the
knowledge it possesses regarding the moral status of the fetus. Simply put,
the Court assumes that the fetus is a morally weighty entity—a "life" that
deserves its utmost respect and deference.
B. The Question of "Life"
Resonant in the Carhart majority opinion is a binary composed of
"alive" and "dead,"58 a binary that speaks most directly to the argument that
I ultimately make: The Court assumes that it knows of the moral status of
the fetus and this assumption unfairly overdetermines the questions that the
Court asks with the undue burden standard.59 Within the Court’s logic,
some things are alive; other things are dead. There is no zone of
indistinction between these two categories; further, there are no categories
external to them. Moreover, the only signifier capable of describing that
passage from one existential category to the next is "kill"; a "live" thing
must be "killed" in order to become a "dead" thing. For the Carhart
majority and the Congress that passed the federal PBA, the fetus, prior to
the abortion procedure, is a "live" thing residing amongst the other natural
phenomena in the "alive" category. The dilemma, then, that the Court must
adjudicate concerns the proper technique by which the "live" fetus in utero
57. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184 n.8 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 158 ("Congress determined that the abortion methods it proscribed had a
‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’ and thus it was concerned with
‘drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’" (citations
omitted)).
59. See infra Part III (explaining this argument).
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becomes a "dead" fetus ex utero. That is, the Court must decide whether it
will give constitutional protection to a technique by which the fetus is
"killed." Blunt in its task, this is the terminology the Court uses.60
The categories of "alive" and "dead" articulated and manipulated in the
majority opinion in Carhart are logical consequences of a foundational
premise—that the fetus has a morally significant "life."61 Indeed, this is the
first announcement that the Court makes, after reciting the procedural
posture of the case: "The Act proscribes a particular manner of ending fetal
life, so it is necessary here, as it was in Stenberg, to discuss abortion

60. See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 136 ("Once dead, moreover, the fetus’ body will
soften, and its removal will be easier." (emphasis added)); id. at 138 ("Another doctor
testified he crushes a fetus’ skull not only to reduce its size but also to ensure the fetus is
dead before it is removed." (emphasis added)); id. at 136 ("Some doctors, especially later in
the second trimester, may kill the fetus a day or two before performing the surgical
evacuation." (emphasis added)); id. at 138 ("Dr. Haskell’s approach is not the only method
of killing the fetus." (emphasis added)).
The majority performs a fascinating rhetorical move when it cites a doctor who testified
in the lower court concerning the method that he uses for performing intact D&E abortion
procedures. The Court’s quotation of the doctor is as follows:
Yet one doctor would not allow delivery of a live fetus younger than [twentyfour] weeks because "the objective of [his] procedure is to perform an abortion,"
not a live birth. The doctor thus answered in the affirmative when asked
whether he would "hold the fetus’ head on the internal side of the [cervix] in
order to collapse the skull" and kill the fetus before it is born.
Id. at 139. The placement of the quotation marks in the Court’s citation of this physician’s
testimony reveals that the physician did not describe himself as "killing" the fetus before it is
"born." The Court provides the text of the doctor’s testimony as he provides exacting detail
of the abortion technique that he uses; however, the Court performs its own editorializing
when it "finishes" the physician’s sentence. That is, it is the voice of the majority, and not
the physician, that describes the physician as "killing the fetus before it is born."
One could argue that the Court’s use of terms such as "living fetus" and "kill" does not
reflect the Court’s own worldview, but rather, indicates that the Court is merely
ventriloquizing the statute at issue. This is to say that it is the statute that contains a logic of
"alive" versus "dead," with "killing" being the apt and only descriptor for the passage from
one category to the next; moreover, it is the statute that criminalizes the behavior of a
physician who would "kill[] a human fetus" after performing "an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus." See id. at 142 (citing the federal PartialBirth Abortion Act, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1531). However, the majority opinion does not
merely make use of the statute’s terminology, but rather expands upon the worldview that
the terminology presupposes—specifically in its affirmation of the federal PBA as an
exercise of the state engaged in the legitimate practice of protecting fetal life, an affirmation
that culminates in the unfalsifiable statement that "[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child." Id. at 158.
61. See infra notes 64–74 and accompanying text (explaining the use of quotation
marks around the word "life").
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procedures in some detail."62 Later in the opinion, the Court provides color
as to how it arrived at its early-announced conclusion that the fetus has a
life: it proclaims, "The Act does apply to both previability and postviability
because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a
living organism while within the womb, whether or not . . . viable outside
the womb."63
The rhetorical trick that Justice Kennedy performs by referring to the
fetus as a "living organism" is that it appears that he only contemplates the
unchallenged biological fact of fetal life. However, throughout the opinion,
the fetal life that is spoken of is not prosaic, biological life, but rather
morally consequential "life." That is, the biological life that characterizes
the "living organism" is not usually considered weighty enough to be the
target of constitutionally protected state expressions of "profound respect";
plain biological life, when terminated, does not commonly suggest "grief,"
"anguish," "profound sorrow" and the expectation that "severe depression
and loss of esteem"64 will follow; biological life at its most exemplary does
not generally conjure up "the bond of love the mother has for her child";65
indeed, "biological life" usually may be thought to be sustained within the
uterus, not the "womb."66 The vocabulary and the imagery that the majority
uses when speaking about the biological life of the fetus as a living
organism suggests that the Court believes that morally salient "life" also
attaches to the biological life of the fetus—that is, that the fetus is an entity
of significant moral value.
In seamlessly attaching "moral life" onto "biological life," the majority
mimics the larger, cultural processes by which the two types of life are
made simultaneous to one another. Historian Barbara Duden tracks these
processes in her compelling "history of life not as an object but as a
notion"—a history that tracks the "conditions under which, in the course of
one generation, technology along with a new discourse has transformed . . .
the unborn into a life, and life into a supreme value."67 She notes the role
62. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 134.
63. Id. at 147. One commentator has noted that this statement reveals that Justice
Kennedy believes that the fetus represents not merely "potential life," but rather "life"
unqualified. See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed
Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2008) ("This statement forms
the first step of Justice Kennedy’s argument, establishing that after conception, life—not
merely potential life—exists independently of fetal personhood.").
64. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 147.
67. BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY AND THE
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that religion has played in this conflation of moral and biological life,
quoting then Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict, who argued that
"right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a human life."68 While
fertilization arguably marks the beginning of biological life, for the
Cardinal, moral life also begins at that point. Duden writes, "He is
accepting a definition from the current frame of a natural science, investing
the object so defined with moral and religious significance and attributing
to this object the status of a person."69 Within certain philosophies, the
appearance of the scientific fact suggests the appearance of a moral fact.
Such philosophies have gained great currency recently.70 Indeed, the
signifier "life" has come to signify moral life in the same moment that it
UNBORN 2 (1994).
68. Id. at 21.
69. Id. The rhetorical act by which moral life is made concurrent with biological life
is readily apparent in a fuller quote of Cardinal Ratzinger’s argumentation:
Certainly no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to the
recognition of a spiritual soul; nevertheless, the conclusions of science regarding
the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by the use of
reason a personal presence at the moment of this first appearance of a human
life: How could a human individual not be a human person?
Id.
70. The administration of George W. Bush helped to popularize philosophies attesting
to the simultaneity of biological life and moral life through its campaign to promote a
"culture of life" in the U.S.—a phenomenon that Sanger tracks in her exposition on infant
"safe haven" laws. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 800–08 (2006) [hereinafter Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws].
Sanger quotes the former President’s first usage of the phrase "culture of life" at a dedication
of the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center:
The culture of life is a welcoming culture, never excluding, never dividing,
never despairing and always affirming the goodness of life in all its seasons. In
the culture of life, we must make room for the stranger. We must comfort the
sick. We must care for the aged. We must welcome the immigrant. We must
teach our children to be gentle with one another. We must defend in love the
innocent child waiting to be born.
Id. at 802. As indicated by the figure of the "innocent child waiting to be born," the
supremely valuable "life" about which the "culture of life" was concerned and which merited
protection began at conception—upon the advent of biological life. Writes Sanger, "‘Life’
now refers to unborn life, no longer from the moment of quickening or from the point of
viability, but from the first instant of fertilization . . . . [T]he culture of life only appears to
have liberated the meaning of ‘life,’ as the word has actually become synonymous with
‘unborn life.’" Id. at 806. Moreover, the "life" protected by the "culture of life" continued,
unchanged, until death. Accordingly, the stem cell, the fetus, and the brain dead—alongside
the stranger, the sick, the aged, and the immigrant—were all in possession of the "life" that
would be embraced by the "culture of life" Id. at 803–04. As the phrase "the culture of life"
began to appear in the official Republican Party Platform, several presidential
proclamations, the 2005 State of the Union Address, and several Senate resolutions, the
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signifies biological life: "[T]he term life (and a life) has become an idol,
and controversy has attached a halo to this idol that precludes its
dispassionate use in ordinary discourse."71 And again, more expansively:
Life itself is not an amoeba word, since it does not have any application
as a technical term in scientific discourse. Unlike zygote and fetus, it
does not stem from the language of a disciplinary thought collective.
And yet it acquires motivating and emotional power from being used by
experts, not only because they use it with pathos but because they claim
special competence in understanding its meaning. Therefore, the
semantic trap into which the use of "a life" leads is not due primarily to
its ambiguity but to its vapidity.72

It seems that the Carhart majority is not adjudicating the question of
the constitutional protection that ought to be afforded to certain
techniques of ending fetal biological life; rather, the majority is
adjudicating the question of whether to afford constitutional protection to
a procedure that "ends" the morally weighty, pathos-invoking,
emotionally consequential "life" of the fetus.73 By accepting fetal "life" as
the object of the intact D&E procedure, the Court has taken a moral
position regarding the status of the fetus.74 It is a moral position,
particular philosophy of "life" that it presupposed gained currency. Id. at 803.
71. DUDEN, supra note 67, at 2.
72. Id. at 75; see also Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe
Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 406 (1992) [hereinafter, Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights] (describing abortion opponents’ views about the wrong occasioned
by abortion in a manner similar to Duden’s description of "life"). Dworkin writes that
opponents "assume that human life is intrinsically valuable, and worthy of a kind of awe,
just because it is human life. Id. They think that once a human life begins, it is a very bad
thing—a kind of sacrilege—that it end prematurely . . . ." Id. He writes about this "life" as
"sacrosanct" and depicts it as possessing an "inherent value"; indeed, when this "life" is
destroyed, it is tantamount to having committed a taboo. Id. at 406–07.
73. The majority’s premise that the fetus has a (morally cognizable) "life," which
exceeds its status as a "living organism," likely explains the majority’s insistence upon
referring to the fetus’s "body"—even when citing physicians who, presumably proficient in
the "scientific terminology" referenced approvingly by the majority earlier in its opinion,
refer to fetal "tissue," and not fetal "bodies." See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 137
(2007). For example, the majority cited a doctor who testified in the lower court as saying
that "[i]f I know I have good dilation . . . and I think I can accomplish . . . the abortion with
an intact delivery, then . . . I don’t close [my forceps] quite so much, and I just gently draw
the tissue out attempting to have an intact delivery, if possible." Id. (emphasis added).
74. It would be incorrect to argue that the view that moral life is simultaneous to
biological life is necessarily a religious position, although many well-respected jurists and
scholars have made such an argument. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S.
490, 565–67 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the belief that "life" begins at
conception necessarily has a "theological basis" and that laws that distinguish between
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abortion and contraception are invalid under the First Amendment because they could serve
"no identifiable secular purpose"); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: A CLASH OF ABSOLUTES
116 (1990) [hereinafter TRIBE, ABORTION] (stating that "beliefs about the point at which
human life begins" have a "theological source"); Laurence H. Tribe, Forward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973)
[hereinafter, Tribe, Forward] ("[A]t this point in the history of industrialized Western
civilization, that decision [to choose conception as the point at which human life begins]
entails not an inference from generally shared premises, whether factual or moral, but a
statement of religious faith."); Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 155 ("We
may describe most people’s beliefs about the inherent value of human life—beliefs deployed
in their opinions about abortion—as essentially religious beliefs."); id. at 158 ("Procreative
decisions are fundamental in a different way; the moral issues on which they hinge are
religious in the broad sense . . . , touching the ultimate purpose and value of human life
itself.").
Dworkin even goes so far as to found the right to abortion in the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of religion. See id. at 165 ("[A]ny government that prohibits abortion
commits itself to a controversial interpretation of the sanctity of life and therefore limits
liberty by commanding one essentially religious position over others, which the First
Amendment forbids."); see also Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional
Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 340 (1995) (contending that all "moral regulations are
essentially religious in nature").
Professor Tribe remains ambivalent on the point of the simultaneity of moral positions
and religious positions regarding the fetus, however. He appears willing to concede the
"theological source" of beliefs concerning the advent of morally significant "life," yet is
unwilling to argue that the religiosity of these beliefs dictate that the government, pursuant
to principles regarding the separation of church and state, stay uninvolved in the dispute. He
writes that, "as a matter of constitutional law, a question such as this, having an irreducibly
moral dimension, cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because many
religions and organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it." TRIBE,
ABORTION, supra note 74, at 116. He concludes that "the arguments of pro-choice advocates
about the religious nature of attempts to define the beginning of a person’s existence as a
separate human being really don’t answer the question of whether or not abortion must be
left to unfettered personal choice." Id.
Nevertheless, I assume that the position that the Court has taken regarding the fetus is
an entirely moral position—as opposed to a religious or theological position. But see
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 414 ("[B]eliefs about the intrinsic
importance of human life are distinguished from more secular convictions about morality,
fairness, and justice."). Moreover, I assume that, although this position may be informed by
religion or theology, it remains capable of being described, at the end of the day, as a moral
position. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV.
352, 379 (1985) (discussing the "moral status" of the fetus). Greenawalt argues that:
If the moral status of the fetus and desirable legal policy are not resolvable on
rational grounds, individuals must decide these questions on some nonrational
basis. For many persons, the basis for judgment is supplied in whole or part by
religious perspectives, which either indicate the fetus’ moral status or gravely
influence one’s mode of thinking about it.
Id.; see also Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws, supra note 70, at 807 (stating that although the
"life" referenced in the "culture of life" "sounds secular enough, its rhetorical value is much
enhanced by its association with Christianity" and noting that "[t]he phrase comes straight
from the Vatican"). Accordingly, while I find attractive Dworkin’s argument that beliefs
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furthermore, that is highly debated; the truth of the position has not been
decided.75 However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, purports
to have decided this question, and he allows that knowledge to be his
guide.76
Moreover, the majority’s assertion that, "by common understanding
and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb"77 unsettles some of the
about the fetus are "essentially religious" in nature and, consequently, that the right to an
abortion might be locatable in the First Amendment’s provision of religious freedom, I do
not accept that argument here. Instead, I will assume that the belief that the fetus is/has a
"life" and, as a cause or an effect of this "life," is a morally significant entity can be a wholly
moral, nonreligious, position; as a result, I do not argue that the majority’s opinion in
Carhart implicates the First Amendment at all.
75. See Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 408 ("The sanctity of life
is . . . a highly contestable value.").
I do not attempt to answer the question of what new knowledge will need to be acquired
before the moral status of the fetus, and at what point "life" begins, can be decided. Cf.
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 799–800 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that the informed consent provisions that were struck down as
unconstitutional in Akron required physicians to tell their patients seeking abortions that life
begins at conception and, consequently, "to advance tendentious statements concerning the
unanswerable question of when human life begins" (emphasis added)). Greenawalt has
argued that science cannot answer these important questions for us. See Greenawalt, supra
note 74, at 374 (contending that science cannot resolve the moral status of the fetus and
noting that "neither factual knowledge nor technology can establish how much consideration
the fetus deserves"). However, perhaps future scientific and nonscientific discoveries will
bring additional information to the debate surrounding the fetus’s moral status—allowing for
a larger moral consensus to build around the fetus and enabling a "rational secular morality
to resolve public policy about abortion." Id. at 372. Nevertheless, it remains true that, at
present, no such moral consensus—nor moral majority, nor moral preponderance—has been
built around the fetus.
76. Commentators have pointed out that the Justice Kennedy, as well as the others
who signed on to his majority opinion in Carhart, is an avowed Catholic. See Geoffrey R.
Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2007, at 19 ("[T]hat all of the Catholic
justices voted as they did in Gonzales might have nothing to do with their personal religious
beliefs. But given the nature of the issue, the strength of the relevant precedent, and the
inadequacy of the court’s reasoning, the question is too obvious to ignore."); Turner, supra
note 36, at 3 ("All five justices in the majority in Gonzales are Roman Catholic. The four
justices who are not all followed clear and settled precedent."). This observation buttresses
the argument that the beliefs about the fetus—that the fetus is "life"—that guided the
majority are inherently religious in nature. However, such a conclusion need not follow; the
fact that all of the Justices in the Carhart majority are Catholic could be nothing more than
mere coincidence. See John Yoo, Partial-Birth Bigotry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2007, at A8
("[N]o one thinks religious belief explains the views of the dissenting justices. Justices
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, it seems, are Jewish, while Justices John Paul
Stevens and David Souter presumably are Protestants.").
77. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 147.
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presumptions underlying the markers employed in abortion jurisprudence.
Essentially, the Court argues that, as a living organism, the previable fetus
has/is as much of a "life" as the postviable fetus. This description of all
fetuses as "alive", as opposed to some other ontological category of
existence, should be interrogated for how it disquiets the tests formulated in
abortion jurisprudence—tests that the Carhart majority must ultimately
deploy, if it is not to overturn sub silentio Casey and the standards that it
pronounced.78
To begin, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence since Casey has
rested on the bright line that separates the category of viable fetuses from
nonviable fetuses.79 Most fundamentally, nonviable fetuses may be the
objects of a legal abortion.80 Viable fetuses, however, may not always be
so; they have interests that—in concert with the state’s interest in the
potential of viable fetuses to become infants—trump the needs, wants, and
desires (but not the health or life) of the women who carry them.81 The
distinction that separates the viable from the nonviable fetus is patently
significant: From the perspective of the pregnant woman and the doctor
who would perform an abortion for her, it distinguishes those abortions that
may be procured within the letter of the law from those that may only be
obtained only under the possibility of criminal sanction. Carhart rehearses
the magnitude of the boundary separating viable and nonviable fetuses
through its citation of Casey:
First is the recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
78. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 874 (1992)
(upholding a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect
that right).
79. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939 (2000) (holding that a Nebraska
regulation was unconstitutional because it unduly burdened the right to choose to have an
abortion before viability); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,
which imposed penalties on "physician[s] who . . . perform[ ] a partial-birth abortion,"
unconstitutionally posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose partially because the
Act did not distinguish between previability and postviability).
80. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156 (stating that "the Act, as we have interpreted it,
would be unconstitutional ‘if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability’" (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 878)).
81. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 ("[S]ubsequent to the viability, the state in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe
abortion except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.").
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from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the
procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child.82

The question in Carhart was whether the criminalization of one
technique for performing abortions unduly burdened the abortion right for
the woman carrying a previable fetus, and whether the lack of health
exception in the law made it constitutionally infirm as it relates to all
abortions, both previability and postviability. The significance of the
"viability" marker, and that the Court might have struck down the law as a
substantial obstacle to previability abortions without regard to its lack of
health exception, is a holdover from Roe, where the Court held that the
"State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life" reaches the
"compelling" point at viability.83 Because there is a compelling state
interest in "fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion
during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother."84 However, prior to viability, there is presumably no
compelling interest in "fetal life"; accordingly the state may not
substantially limit a woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy during that
time.
The question then becomes: why viability? Why did Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Roe majority, find that viability marked the point
where the state’s important and legitimate interest in "potential life"
sufficiently matured, became compelling, and justified the possible
proscription of abortion altogether? I offer the following as explanation:
For Justice Blackmun, viability makes sense as a site at which to make
distinctions between legitimate interests and compelling interests—as a site
before which to allow abortions and after which to ban abortions—because
he takes seriously the distinction that he draws between "potential life" and

82. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 163–64 (1973) (holding that a woman has a
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a State may regulate areas
protected by this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards,
and protecting potential life).
84. Id.
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unqualified "life."85 Note that when Blackmun announces one of the
fundamental holdings of the decision, he refers to previable fetuses as in
possession of "potential life" and postviable fetuses as in possession of a,
without qualifications, "life."86 Viability, then, is the point at which the
potential life of the fetus emerges as a life, thereby affording the fetus a
whole or quasi-whole membership within the human community—and
thereby making it a legitimate target for regulations designed to protect it.87
If we accept the above reasoning as justification for assigning
constitutional significance to viability, then one understands as highly
significant Justice Kennedy’s casual assertion in Carhart that the "fetus is a
living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside
the womb," as well as his relatively cavalier description of the pre- and
post-viability abortion procedures at issue as concerning "a particular

85. Justice Blackmun suggests as much when, arguing in dissent sixteen years later, he
defends Roe:
The viability link reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it
marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from
the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of
rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.
At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that
as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the
uterine environment, the State’s interest in the fetus’ potential human life, and in
fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling.
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State’s . . . interest in potential life,
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal
life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.").
87. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The viability line
reflects the biological . . . fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a
fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot . . . be regarded as a subject of
rights or interests distinct from . . . those of the pregnant woman."). However, Laurence
Tribe reaches a different conclusion about why Justice Blackmun chose viability as the point
at which to allow for the proscription of abortion. Writing shortly after the decision in Roe,
Tribe wrote that Justice Blackmun did not choose viability "because of some illusion that
this biologically arbitrary point signals ‘any morally significant change in the developing
human’ and certainly not because of any . . . notion that the fetus is intrinsically a human
being from that technology-dependent point forward . . . ." Tribe, Forward, supra note 74,
at 27. I disagree. Justice Blackmun’s careful usage of "potential life" and "life" suggests
that he believes that the previable fetus (signified by "potential life") does not possess the
same moral significance as the postviable fetus (signified by "life"); accordingly, the
"biologically arbitrary" point of viability would absolutely signal a "morally significant
change in the developing human." See Webster, 492 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing the issue).
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manner of ending fetal life."88 With these simple pronouncements, the
majority asserts the insignificance of viability as a site distinguishing
potential life from unqualified life. With this pronouncement, Carhart
makes the "bright line" of viability no more than an arbitrary moment, a
moment among moments, within the continuous, always already "life" of
the fetus. As such, Carhart can be read to eliminate the significance of
viability as a marker, and therefore eliminate the significance of the
distinction between the pre-viable and post-viable stages of pregnancy.89
What follows from the evanescence of the distinction between pre- and
post-viable stages of pregnancy and the differing levels of gravity that have
been attributed to them is that the justification for curbing the ability of the
state to proscribe abortions outright during pre-viability is also eliminated.
As such, Carhart opens the way for the outright proscription of all
abortions, as what is now at stake is already and always "life."90
88. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134, 147 (2007).
89. Justice Kennedy argues in favor of diminishing the significance of viability in his
dissent in Stenberg, noting that the state has an interest in promoting "the dignity and value
of human life, even life which cannot survive without the assistance of others." Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Indeed, perhaps the most
paradigmatic form of human life that cannot survive without the assistance of others is the
previable fetus.
90. This is not a new argument; indeed, since Roe was decided in 1973, those Justices
who believe that there ought not to be a Constitutionally protected right to an abortion had
made variations of the claim that viability is an arbitrary point at which the state’s interest in
fetal life becomes compelling and, accordingly, that the trimester framework did not
properly respect that interest. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 ("[W]e do not see why the
State’s interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the
point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation
[only] after viability."); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
746, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("The State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity in
itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under
conventional medical wisdom. . . . [T]he State’s interest, if compelling after viability, is
equally compelling before viability."); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 459 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Roe recognized the State interest in
protecting the fetal life, but that "the point at which these interests become compelling does
not depend on the trimester of pregnancy," rather that "these interests are present throughout
pregnancy"); id. at 461 ("[P]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy
than it is at viability or afterward . . . . [Choosing] viability as the point . . . the state interest
in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before
viability or . . . afterward.").
Well before Casey replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden standard,
and well before it was demonstrated that any standard that presupposes the continuous "life"
of the fetus is incapable of adequately protecting a woman’s abortion right, Justice
Blackmun presciently predicted such an outcome. In his scathing dissent in Webster, which
upheld various regulations that increased the cost of an abortion and functioned to limit its
availability, Justice Blackmun noted that when fetal "life" is imagined as existing,
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Interestingly, the majority opinion in Carhart contains a fascinating
moment in which the Court is presented with evidence—coming, ironically,
from a proponent of the abortion right—that viability may not be as bright
of a line as Justice Blackmun had hoped it would be when he wrote the
majority opinion in Roe; however, the Carhart majority, clearly
sympathetic to the position that viability is an arbitrary occasion during the
always already significant "life" of the fetus, disregards this evidence and
proceeds with conceptualizing viability as a definite, if not definitive,
moment in fetal life. To explain: The categories of viability and
nonviability do a lot of work within abortion jurisprudence. One can argue
that at least part of the reason why they were offered up to do this work was
because they were thought not to be subject to interpretation: Fetuses are
either viable, or they are not.91 But, the Carhart Court had been presented
unchanged, from fertilization until birth, the state is justified in restricting abortions at any
point during a woman’s pregnancy. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Since, in the plurality’s view, the State’s interest in potential life is compelling as of the
moment of conception, . . . every hindrance to a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion must
be ‘permissible.’"). Because he believed the Court to be taking a turn towards an
understanding of "life" that began at conception, and because he likely understood the
consequences of building an abortion jurisprudence around such a notion of "life,"
Blackmun concluded his opinion pessimistically: "For today, at least, the law of abortion
stands undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still remain at liberty to control
their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows." Id. at
560.
91. This is not to deny that the Court has recognized that scientific innovation allows
for some movement of the line at which fetal viability will be drawn. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) ("We have seen how . . . advances
in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier [in pregnancy].");
Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("As medical science becomes better able
to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back
toward conception."). While the Court has acknowledged that medical technology may
affect the gestational age at which a fetus becomes viable, the question for the Court is when
fetal viability begins, not the quantity of viability present in the fetus. For the Court, science
determines when viability occurs for the fetus, not how much viability a fetus has. However,
the physician that the Carhart majority quotes suggests that it may be equally reasonable to
think of viability not as a binary, but rather as a spectrum or zone. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at
140 (quoting the physician as saying that he sometimes removes from a woman’s body a
fetus that has "‘some viability to it, some movement of limbs’").
Webster, which upheld a Missouri regulation that required that physicians test fetuses
for viability before performing an abortion on a woman more than twenty weeks pregnant,
supports the claim that the Court is interested in determining whether or not a fetus is viable,
as opposed to how much viability a fetus has. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 519–20 (1989) (upholding the Missouri statute requiring tests for viability prior to
obtaining an abortion). The Court interpreted the statute as establishing a presumption of
fetal viability at twenty weeks that could be rebutted by tests establishing fetal weight and
lung capacity. Id. at 515. For the Court, at issue was the question of whether a particular
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with evidence disputing this simple dichotomy. Quoted in the majority
opinion is a physician who testified about the "difficult situation" in which
he and his staff are placed when, in the course of performing an abortion, he
removes from a woman’s body a fetus that has "’some viability to it, some
movement of limbs.’"92 With the simple description of a fetus that has
"some viability to it," this unnamed doctor exposes viability as a concept
that cannot be always apprehended as dichotomous. Viability, instead, may
be a continuum. Accordingly, the jurisprudential naming of viable fetuses
as distinct from nonviable fetuses is revealed to be an act of construction. It
is an act of fabricating, and then stabilizing, boundaries that may be
desirable insofar as they are helpful tools in the adjudication of
constitutional dilemmas, yet have no privileged relationship to the material
world. That is, instead of merely describing the material world, these
boundaries and the categories they produce construe the material world;
they are no more than one set of many interpretive lenses through which the
material world may be viewed. Yet, the Carhart majority ignores this
competing logic regarding the concept of viability; it assumes instead that
viability is neither an act of construction nor a spectrum with so many
shades of gray. The majority says nothing about these possibilities and,
instead, remains committed to assuming that viability is fairly and
appropriately conceptualized in dichotomous terms.93
The question is why. Why did the majority reject an opportunity to
demonstrate what could be described as Justice Blackmun’s folly or, more
benignly, his act of judicial construction? Why did the majority ignore an
occasion to propose that viability—having no clear, defined relationship to
the material world—is an unsound structure around which to build an
abortion right, and consequently, that the abortion right ought to be
twenty-week fetus was viable—not the alternative question of how much viability the
particular twenty-week fetus has.
92. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 140 (citations omitted).
93. What if the Court apprehended and acknowledged viability as a concept that
refused description in binary terms? What if the Court respected that a fetus could have
"some viability to it"—that it could limn the falsely dichotomous categories posited in Casey
and the subsequent abortion cases? Abortion jurisprudence would likely not crumble into an
abyss of intelligibility as its foundation is pulled out from under it. Rather, the Court might
keep viability as the event which separates legal and illegal abortions; however, the Court
would have to, explicitly, interpret this site. Moreover, in the process of interpreting this
site, the Court might have to admit that, contrary to the presuppositions upon which it has
formerly relied, viability does not simply correspond to a site that exists "out there" in the
material world. Instead, there is some interpretive space between the signifier "viability"
and the thing that it signifies. Accordingly, when the Court names a moment as the moment
of "viability," it constructs the thing that it names.
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reconsidered? I imagine that the majority felt no need to parse the
metaphysics of viability in order to intimate towards the conclusion that the
abortion right, as presently constructed, begs for its own dismantling. The
majority might be aware that with its simple offer that "by common
understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while
within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb," it has
introduced the fetus as "life" into constitutional law and, in so doing, has
paved the way for the reversal of Roe.94
***

In this Part, I have hoped to demonstrate that at the very foundation of
Carhart rests the disputed proposition that the fetus is a morally significant
"life" that deserves reverence of the highest order. The majority opinion in
Carhart proceeds from the assumption that the Court has found an answer
to the vexing, divisive, highly debated question of what moral status ought
to be given to the fetus. Gone are the days when the Court felt itself
incapable of deciding this question—when a humble majority once wrote,
"We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary . . . is not in a
position to speculate as to the answer."95 Retiring the humility that once
characterized the Court’s approach to the ontological issues raised by
abortion,96 the Carhart majority assumes that all fetuses, viable or not, are
94. Other scholars have similarly interpreted Carhart as laying the conditions of
possibility for the overturning of Roe. See, e.g., Cynthia D. Lockett, The Beginning of the
End: The Diminished Abortion Right Following Carhart and Planned Parenthood, 11 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 337, 337–38 (2008) (giving a grim account of a fictional United
States of the future, in which the Court’s decision in Carhart directly led to the reversal of
Roe and the subsequent deaths of over 10,000 women from illegal abortions); Plante, supra
note 36, at 389 ("Taken to its logical conclusion, Carhart diminishes the rights extended in
Roe v. Wade so significantly that it suggests a de facto overruling of Roe is imminent.");
Suter, supra note 42, at 1569 (arguing that Carhart represents "an attempt to strengthen the
Court’s weighting of the state’s interest in potential human life, which may one day uphold a
ban of previable abortions"); id. at 1586 (stating that Carhart "begins to undo the wellestablished precedent that the state may not prohibit previable abortions and opens the door
to future bans of previable abortion procedures based on visceral concerns about the
sensibilities of the community and the medical profession").
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
96. Ironically, while Carhart represents the Court moving away from a humility with
regard to its confidence in its ability to decide the ontological questions and moral issues that
abortion raises, the Court is arguably becoming more humble about its ability to be the
grand, final arbiter of other moral questions. Suzanne Goldberg writes about how the Court,
in the past, had felt certain that it could declare the "right" morality; presently, however, the
knowledge that it could not divine the "right" moral position among the various positions
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entities with moral value—that is, that the fetus is a "life" in the morally
significant, weighty, "supreme value" sense of the term.97 This proposition
led the Court to the axiomatic conclusion that abortion harms women.
Moreover, this proposition is what eviscerates the undue burden standard.
Part III explores how ideas about the fetus as a morally significant,
theologically informed, spiritually inclined "life" have been built into the
undue burden standard. This Part argues that when the undue burden
standard proceeds from the assumption that the fetus is a morally
consequential "life," the ability of the standard to protect the abortion right
from diminishment decreases. This Part goes on to trace the contours of an
undue burden standard that refuses such assumptions—that is, the morally
agnostic undue burden standard.
III. The Burdens of the Undue Burden Standard
The undue burden standard represents the compromise that the
Supreme Court has struck between competing social movements.98 This
that exist among the nation’s citizens has led the Court away from relying on morals-based
rationales for laws. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1289 (2004). Goldberg argues
that,
Whatever credibility the Court might have possessed previously to announce
moral consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely . . . . The lack of
an authoritative alternative to majoritarian preferences that could enable
meaningful, objective assessment of proposed moral justifications has
reinforced, in turn, the Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based
justification.
Id.
97. Justice Kennedy has an established record of evoking "life" in its morally
significant, weighty, "supreme value" sense. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart¸530 U.S. 914,
979 (2000) (Kennedy J., dissenting) (noting the "intrinsic value of human life, including the
life of the unborn").
98. Some may argue that politics and social movements should play no role in
Constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, it remains that Casey and its finding that the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to abortion were, in part, the results of social
movement and protest. In her excursus on the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice O’Connor
writes about the damage to the Court’s authority that would occur if the Court capitulated to
the "pro-life" movement and overturned Roe just nineteen years after it was decided. See
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (describing the danger in
the scenario of the Court overturning Roe without demonstrating that it was acting
independently of "political pressure," saying, "to overrule under fire in the absence of the
most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s
legitimacy beyond any serious question"). Indeed, O’Connor suggests that Roe should be
upheld, if for no other reason than the fact that upholding Roe permits the Court to
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standard purports to balance the interests of those desiring to protect the
(morally significant) "life" of the fetus from an untimely and premature
"death" against the interests of those who may disagree that the fetus has a
"life" or who may believe that, even conceding the existence of fetal "life,"
a woman ought not to be coerced to sustain the "life" of an unwanted
fetus.99 However, the alive/dead binary, and the pathos with which the
demonstrate to the country that it is not a political branch. See id. at 869 ("[T]o overrule
Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to
the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law."). Essentially, O’Connor’s exposition concedes
that politics and social movements indeed played a role in Casey—if only to convince the
Justices to cling to Roe all the more tenaciously. So conceded, it is fair to conclude that the
undue burden standard intended was constructed in such a way as to bring the "contending
sides of a national controversy to end their national division." Id. at 867. That is, it was a
compromise.
99. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) ("Casey, in short, struck a balance.
The balance was central to its holding."). While the nature of this balance may be articulated
as one between "individual rights" and "state interests," I do not think it incorrect to
conceptualize the competition in terms of differing beliefs surrounding the moral status of
the fetus. Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of PrivacyInvading Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the
Undue-Burden Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1, 53 (1996) ("As applied in Casey, the undue-burden
test operates . . . as an expression of the ultimate balance between individual abortion rights
and conflicting state interests . . . ."). Accordingly, while it is appropriate to claim that the
undue burden standard balances the state’s interest in potential life against the woman’s
individual right to an abortion, it is equally appropriate to claim that the undue burden
standard balances the interests of those who believe that the moral status of the fetus as a
"life" should (always, or in most cases) dictate the trajectory that pregnancies should take
against those who do not believe that the fetus is a moral subject or who do not think that the
fetus’s moral status is always dispositive. Furthermore, the latter formulation might be a
preferable description of the interests balanced by the undue burden standard insofar as it is
frequently forms the substance behind slogans of "individual rights" and "state interests."
Interestingly, when Justice O’Connor began formulating the undue burden test in her
dissenting opinion in Akron, the standard was substantially different from the form that it
would ultimately assume in Casey. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("The ‘undue burden’ in the abortion cases
represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this court can require
a state to justify its legislature actions under the exacting "compelling state interest
standard."). As Justice O’Connor articulates the undue burden standard, in Akron, a finding
that a regulation imposed an "undue burden" on the abortion right did not mean that the
regulation was constitutionally infirm; it meant that the reviewing court must then subject
the regulation to strict scrutiny. See id. (articulating the standard). Alternatively, a finding
that a regulation did not impose an "undue burden" on the abortion right meant that the
reviewing court must subject the regulation to rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 452 (arguing
that if a regulation is not unduly burdensome, then the court should limit its determination to
the question of whether "the negotiation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose"); see
also Appleton, supra note 99, at 51 ("In its 1983 incarnation, Justice O’Connor’s undueburden test served as a threshold for strict scrutiny, with less burdensome interferences
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Court describes the fetal "life" that would be "killed" by the intact D&E
procedure—and all other abortion procedures—intimate that the Court has
aligned itself ideologically with one of the competing social movements in
this area. Differently stated, the Court, with a modernist confidence,
professes to know the moral status of fetal "life" and its inherent value;
moreover, this is a knowledge, a truth, which the anti-abortion/pro–"life"
campaign also claims to know. The undue burden standard, as deployed in
recent abortion jurisprudence, reflects this "truth" to the point that one
could argue that the standard has become ineffective in accomplishing its
purpose of balancing competing interests.100
To elaborate upon the last point: the undue burden standard must
represent a balance between the interests of those who would protect fetal
"life" against those who would protect the decisional autonomy and bodily
integrity of the woman (a woman who may or may not ascribe to notions of
fetal "life").101 The standard is less effective as a compromise when it
evoking only rational-basis review."). Because a finding of an undue burden triggered strict
scrutiny—a scrutiny that implies that a law regulates on the basis of a suspect classification
or that a law infringes upon a fundamental right—while no such finding dictated that rational
basis scrutiny was appropriate, one could argue that such a formulation of the undue burden
standard balanced the interests of those who believed that the right to an abortion is a
fundamental right against those who disagree.
100. Others have argued that the undue burden standard has become an ineffective
protection of the abortion right because the Court uses it as if it was nothing more than a
rational basis review. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[i]nstead of the heightened scrutiny we have previously applied, the Court determines
that a ‘rational’ ground is enough to uphold the Act"); see also Tepich, supra note 49, at 382
("This new standard becomes even more troubling . . . when one realizes how far it strays
from the precedent established in Casey . . . . While claiming to use the undue-burden
standard in Carhart, Justice Kennedy in fact employs rational-basis review . . . ."). While
the undue burden standard may be approximating rational basis review, it is because the
presumption of fetal "life" prevents the Court from being more critical of abortion
regulations. Cf. id. at 383 (arguing that the undue burden standard, as deployed by the Court
in Carhart, represents a "compete evisceration of the Casey undue-burden standard"
(quotations omitted)).
101. One scholar has similarly noted that the undue burden standard, as deployed in
Carhart, no longer operates as an effective balance between competing interests; however,
this scholar argues that the standard’s inefficacy results from the fact that the interest in
women’s health and the interest in the life of the fetus weighed against one another in Casey.
See Ivey, supra note 36, at 1486 (stating that prior to Carhart, "the woman’s interest in
autonomy and choice weighs in direct opposition to the state’s interest in potential life").
However, after Carhart, the interest in women’s health—that is, her psychological health—
weighs against abortion. See id. (quoting Congressional findings, which avowed also that
"[a] ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure will therefore advance the health interests of
pregnant women seeking to terminate a pregnancy" (quotations omitted)). When both the
interest in fetal life and the interest in women’s health weigh against abortion, the undue
burden standard balances nothing and tends to allow all restrictions on abortion to pass
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purports to balance the interests of those who would protect (always already
valuable) fetal "life" against those who would not protect (always already
valuable) fetal "life." A contest had on such terms pits a morally superior
party against a morally debased one—a view of the abortion debate that an
individual Justice may have but which, importantly, the standard must not
embody and the jurisprudence must not reflect.
Furthermore, when the undue burden standard endeavors to "balance"
the interests of those who would protect the fetus’s right to "life" against
those who would not protect the fetus’s right to "life," the standard and its
operation function to merely reiterate the existence and value of fetal "life."
It bears repeating that this is a position that is highly disputed102 and that the
Court is not institutionally empowered to decide.103 Consider again the
Court’s consideration of the criminal abortion statute at issue in Roe:
constitutional muster. See id. (asking "[i]f the woman’s and fetus’s interests are in
alignment," could "one possibly be an undue burden on the other"); see also id. at 1486–87
(concluding that "in suggesting that regulations on abortion—even a unilateral prohibition—
promote a woman’s health by protecting her from emotional and psychiatric repercussions of
her decisions, those opposing abortion are reconfiguring the undue burden test").
102. Dworkin summarizes the debate concerning the moral status of the fetus as one
between a side that "thinks that a human fetus is already a moral subject" and another side
that "thinks that a just-conceived fetus is merely a collection of cells under the command not
of a brain but of only a genetic code." RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 10 (1993). My point
is to emphasize that neither side of the debate concerning whether or not the fetus is a moral
subject has emerged victorious; furthermore, I emphasize that neither side of the debate may
ever emerge as victorious. This is not to argue that we are required to be indifferent towards
the question of the fetus’s moral status as a result of the impossibility of objective
knowledge about it. See TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 74, at 119 ("[I]t’s hard to agree with
those who insist that this question [of the fetus’s moral status], simply because it lacks a
meaningful scientific or otherwise purely ‘objective’ and incontrovertible answer, can have
no ‘answer’ at all."); see also id. at 120 ("We may have no answer, but we cannot deny
either that the question is important or that it makes sense to ask it."). But rather, it means
that the judiciary may not legitimately incorporate one position regarding the fetus into the
standard with which it balances the interests of those who believe in the moral significance
of the fetus against those who disbelieve. See infra Part III.A (expanding on this point).
103. Professor Charo’s work regarding the Human Embryo Research Panel is a
constructive point of comparison. See generally R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The
Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
11 (1995). The Human Embryo Research Panel, brimming with "expertise in embryology,
medicine, law, philosophy, and personal experience," was assembled by the federal
government to determine the moral status of the embryo such that guidelines could be
formulated regarding the federal funding of embryo research. Id. at 13. Although the Panel did
manage to produce guidelines, these guidelines were not based on the definitive moral status of
the embryo having been found; indeed, "no clear-cut answer to the moral status of the embryo
could be found." Id. at 11. Professor Charo argues that the guidelines "would have been
immeasurably strengthened . . . if it had squarely acknowledged that it is impossible for a
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Texas urges that . . . life begins at conception and is present throughout
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in
protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on
this most sensitive and difficult question.104

The opinion then goes on to discuss theories regarding the beginning
of morally significant "life" within various schools of thought and areas of
the law, stating at one point that "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the
law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it,
begins before live birth."105 This is an implicit recognition that it is
legitimate and reasonable to believe that morally significant "life" begins
subsequent to a live birth. Yet, contrast that recognition with Carhart in its
approving citation of Congress’s argument that "‘implicitly approving such
a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
and innocent human life.’"106 Contrast Roe’s acknowledgement that the
"life" of the "supreme value" kind may possibly only begin subsequent to a
live birth with Carhart’s finding that the criminalization of intact D&E

governmental body to determine the moral status of the embryo . . . ." Id. at 12. She argues
that the Panel’s conclusions regarding federal financing of embryo research would have been
strengthened "if they had been supported by arguments focusing on the interests of research
opponents and proponents rather than conclusions concerning the moral status of the
embryo." Id. at 13. Similarly, I argue that it is impossible for a governmental body—in this
case, the judiciary—to determine the moral status of the fetus; yet, the Supreme Court in
Carhart appears to have "determined" this status. Moreover, while Charo contends that the
Panel’s focus ought to have been on the interests of opponents and proponents of embryo
research, I contend instead that the Court ought to "get out of the business" of philosophizing
about the fetus’s moral status and proceed with a moral agnosticism towards this question.
Id. at 159–60. The undue burden standard should embody this agnosticism.
104. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973); see also Charo, supra note 103, at 20
(reading this passage of Roe as articulating Justice Blackmun’s sense that "government
cannot make findings of theological or philosophical fact on the status of prenatal life"). It
should be obvious that the Roe Court in this passage was referencing morally significant
"life," and not mere biological life, when it claims that it need not "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
105. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161; see also Charo, supra note 103, at 20 (arguing that the Roe
majority "opinion did not try to assign a precise moral or legal status to fetal life").
106. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).

950

67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010)

procedures "expresses respect for the dignity of human life."107 While Roe
hesitated to take a position with regard to the moral status of the fetus and
the "life" it may or may not have, Carhart appears fully confident of the
fetus’s moral status and is comfortable in allowing the decision to deny
constitutional protection to the intact D&E procedure to hinge on that moral
status. And so, it would seem that not only has the post-Roe abortion
jurisprudence rejected Roe’s trimester framework, but it has also rejected
Roe’s refusal to decide that a morally intelligible "life" begins at some point
prior to birth.
In sum, the Court has accepted a disputable and disputed position
about the moral status of the fetus by accepting the premise that the fetus
has a morally meaningful "life"; furthermore, this presupposition has been
wedged into the undue burden standard—making the question that the
Court must answer in each instance that it hears a case regarding an
abortion regulation one concerning how to strike a compromise between
those interested in the fetus’s "life" and those not interested in its "life."
Stated differently, when the undue burden proceeds from the assumption
that the fetus is a "life," it overdetermines the questions that the Court asks
when adjudicating the constitutionality of an abortion regulation.
As presently conceptualized, the Court asks whether a regulation
unduly burdens the abortion right by excessively expressing respect for and
giving deference to the "life" of the fetus; conversely, the Court asks
whether a regulation only, duly, burdens the abortion right by temperately
and judiciously expressing respect for and giving deference to the "life" of
the fetus. These are problematic constructions of what qualifies as undue
and due burdens.108 If reconceptualized in the way that I propose, an undue
burden might be thought to reference those measures that impose upon the
woman a conception of the inherent, moral value of fetal life—in
107. Id.
108. The Casey plurality opinion explains that "undue burden" is synonymous with a
"substantial obstacle"; accordingly, any legislation that places a substantial obstacle in a
woman’s path to an abortion is, consequently, "unduly burdensome," and therefore
unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) ("A
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."). If the terms are indeed equivalents, then one may strike the
adjectives from the phrases and read Casey’s holding as positing that the state may
constitutionally impose "burdens" on, and "obstacles" in front of, a woman’s right to choose
an abortion. This may be a refreshingly honest portrayal of how scores of women,
physically and mentally burdened with unwanted pregnancies, experience the state’s
"legitimate"—and post-Casey, constitutional—expressions of its "profound respect" for the
potential life of the fetus.
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derogation of her own personal views concerning fetal life, or in derogation
of whether she believes that those views should determine the trajectory
that her pregnancy should take. Similarly, a due burden might be thought to
refer to those measures that do not impose upon the woman any particular
conception of the moral status of the fetus.
When the ideology of one of the disputants is built into the very
standard that is supposed to balance the interests of the disputants, the
standard operates illegitimately. In essence, the jurisprudential deck is
stacked—to the detriment of the interests of one party. The result is not
justice (to the extent that justice within abortion jurisprudence is imagined
as respect for competing moral worldviews within the law), but tautology.
Effectively, to the extent that the undue burden standard has built into it the
intrinsic and indisputable fact and value of fetal "life," the antiabortion
movement has "captured the Judiciary." 109
While I am making the argument that the Court has accepted a highly
contested position regarding the moral status of the fetus and that the Court
has illegitimately embedded this position into the undue burden standard, it
is important to recognize that this argument is dramatically different from
the claim that the government may never regulate based on some notion of
morality. While there are scholars who present forceful, convincing
109. This is not to say that the undue burden standard has always operated
illegitimately; that is, this is not to say that the notion that the fetus has a "life" has been built
into the undue burden standard from its inception. Consider the following: Casey found that
the undue burden standard suitably balanced the woman’s interest in terminating an
unwanted pregnancy against "the interest of the State in the protection of potential life," and
argued that while the "Roe Court recognized the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life,’" the trimester framework failed to adequately
protect that potentiality due to the fact that it prohibited states from burdening the woman’s
right to abortion during the first trimester. Id. at 871 (emphasis added); see also id. at 873
(saying that the trimester framework "undervalues the State’s interest in potential life"). The
Casey plurality opinion appears indecisive as to whether it intends to argue that that which is
aborted is "life" or "potential life." At several points in the beginning of the opinion, Justice
O’Connor writes that the question of abortion concerns "life or potential life." Id. at 852.
She notes that abortion is "an act that is fraught with consequences for others: for the
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; . . . and, depending on one’s
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted." Id. Elsewhere, she writes that "[t]he
trimester framework . . . does not fulfill Roe’s own promise that the State has an interest in
protecting fetal life or potential life." Id. at 876. Yet, as the opinion progresses, O’Connor
appears to decide that that which is at stake in the question of abortion is not really life, but
rather "potential life"; accordingly, she refers only to "potential life" in the latter Parts of the
opinion. See id. at 877–901 (referring only to "potential life" rather than "life or potential
life"). Overall, it would appear that Casey was ambivalent with regard to the question of
fetal "life"; accordingly, insofar as Carhart proceeds from the conviction that the fetus has a
"life," it represents a dramatic departure from Casey.

952

67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010)

arguments that "it is never permissible for government to regulate an
individual’s behavior if the government’s primary motivation for the
regulation is to enforce the moral beliefs of those who control the political
process," and consequently, "government policy must be premised
primarily on some rationale other than morality" in order to pass
constitutional muster,110 this is not the argument that I am advancing here.
Instead, I am willing to assume, arguendo, that included within the state’s
broad police power is the power to regulate for the purpose of guarding the
morality of the state’s subjects;111 as a result, I accept that the rationale for a
regulation may be a bare moral conviction.112
110. Gey, supra note 74, at 331. Other scholars also make cogent arguments to the
effect that the state ought to regulate with a moral neutrality—arguments with which I tend
to agree. In a scathing critique of the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal statute that sought
to deny same-sex couples the right to legally marry, ethicist Walen argues that "our culture is
permeated by a current of authoritarian moral thinking," with "many in our culture think[ing]
that questioning or revising certain received truths only leads to chaos and immorality; they
believe that if the state does not enforce their values, disaster will follow." Alec Walen, The
‘Defense of Marriage Act’ and Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 619,
621 (1997). Walen argues that the inability to see that there is "virtue in the state being
neutral between competing moral conceptions . . . symbolizes the extent to which we as a
culture have not yet come to terms with the ideals of liberty and equality that we espouse."
Id. However, it is not my aim, in this Article, to argue that the Constitution commands a
moral relativism from states.
111. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 503
(1986) (arguing that the police power "is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people"
(emphasis added) (citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905))).
112. The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas arguably restricted the truth of this
statement. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("‘[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .’" (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
Suzanne Goldberg makes an interesting argument that although the Supreme Court,
prior to Lawrence v. Texas, consistently avowed that the state may shape public morality
through law and, consequently, may pass laws that serve no other purpose but to guard the
morality of the public, the post World War II Court had never upheld a law based on the sole
justification that the law protected the morals of the people—with the only exception being
the now-reversed decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. See Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1235–
36, 1245 ("Notwithstanding its ubiquitous rhetorical endorsements of government’s police
power to promote morality, it turns out that the Court has almost never relied exclusively
and overtly on morality to justify government action."). Goldberg argues that Bowers was
anomalous insofar as it was the only decision since the mid-twentieth century to rely on a
purely morals-based rationale for upholding a law. Id. at 1256; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at
196 (stating that "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" is an adequate rationale for upholding the
law at issue). She writes, "[M]ajority opinions in cases referencing and endorsing
government’s power to regulate morals have almost never relied exclusively on an explicit,
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However, the rationale for an abortion regulation may not be a bare
moral conviction. In effect, the undue burden standard affirmed that a
woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy was such an important one
that it would not be subordinated to the morality of others, even a moral
majority.113 Essentially, while the state may, generally speaking, impose
its morality on its subjects by outlawing or regulating conduct on moral
grounds, it cannot legitimately do so when the conduct involves
abortion.114
The undue burden standard is the tool with which the judiciary
ensures that the state has not imposed its morality—specifically, its views
pure reference to morality to uphold a law, typically choosing instead to sustain government
action based on observable societal harms." Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1259. She offers
the Court’s decision in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slanton I, which is frequently cited as a case
in which the Court affirmed the legitimacy of the state to regulate on the basis of morals
alone, as nothing more than a rhetorical affirmation of "the sufficiency of morals-based
rationales." Id. at 1269 (citing Paris Adult Theatre v. Slanton I, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)). She
writes, "[T]he decision itself specifically disavowed reliance on moral interests. . . . The
Court’s reference to [the State’s right to maintain] a ‘decent society,’ although left
undefined, must be understood to fall outside moral concerns, given the earlier stress on the
morally neutral nature of the obscenity law." Id. at 1269–70. She also notes that the Court
"identified several other interests that might legitimately support regulation of obscenity. In
connection with public safety, for example, the Court pointed to reports of ‘an arguable
correlation between obscene material and crime.’" Id. at 1270. Goldberg goes on to explain
the inconsistency between the Court’s pro-morals rhetoric and its anti-morals practice in
terms of a tension between the Court’s desire and duty to screen whether morals-based
rationales are merely a cover for impermissible and unconstitutional biases and the Court’s
concern with the counter-majoritarian difficulties produced when it uses its own moral
standards to strike down morality-protective laws passed by the electorate. Id. at 1237–38.
Gey argues, quite convincingly, that the rationale for a state policy ought never to be a
bare moral conviction. See Gey, supra note 74, at 331 ("[G]overnment policy must be
premised primarily on some rationale other than morality . . . ."). He argues that moral
regulation corrupts democracy insofar as it forces the morality of the present moral majority
upon future citizens and moral majorities, indefinitely extending what would be temporary
political power. Id. at 332. Accordingly, he would require that every regulation have both
an "amoral purpose" as well as a "substantially amoral effect." Id. at 391.
113. Gey, supra note 74, at 333 (arguing that "the Supreme Court typically exempts the
category of fundamental rights from [the] general rule" that "the Constitution does not limit
the government’s authority to regulate and enforce morality"); see also id. at 362 ("The
constitutional demand that morally laden decisions be insulated from state regulation is also
a central feature of the Court’s abortion decisions."); id. ("The Court’s drift away from the
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade has not diminished the support a majority of the Court
continues to express for the central element of moral relativism at the heart of the privacy
right.").
114. See id. at 365 (contending that "the majority in Casey made the . . . determination
that no governmental entity—neither the Court nor the legislature—may make the value
judgment that abortion is immoral and then impose that judgment through legal sanctions on
those who disagree").
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concerning the moral status of the fetus—on its subjects. In so doing, the
standard guarantees that there exists a space around the abortion decision
wherein a woman would be free to decide whether and when over the
course of the pregnancy she would grant the fetus a moral status, and if so,
whether she would allow the moral status so granted to determine the
trajectory of her pregnancy. In other words, the undue burden standard
would create conditions within which a moral pluralism could develop
around the fetus and abortion, more generally.115
A. The Morally Agnostic Undue Burden Standard
In order for the courts to ensure that the state’s view regarding the
moral status of the fetus has not contaminated or contracted the space of
moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion decision, the undue
burden standard must itself be uncommitted to any view of the fetus’s
moral status. Accordingly, when I describe the standard as operating
illegitimately, this is to say that the standard is not proceeding with a moral
agnosticism—a position that fully accepts that it does not know the truth of
the fetus’s moral status and that an objective truth on the matter is an
impossibility. Instead, the standard currently proceeds with a conviction
regarding the truth of the fetus as possessor of the supreme value of "life."
Because the standard proceeds from the assumption held by one of the
contesting parties in the abortion debate, the standard functions not as a
dispassionate arbiter of competing parties’ interests, but rather as an
apparatus that reiterates the correctness of one parties’ view while tending
to decide questions in its favor.
115. Dworkin has reached a similar conclusion, although he makes his argument in
terms of "conformity" and "responsibility." Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72,
at 408. He argues that the state ought not to attempt to produce "conformity" in beliefs
regarding the fetus’s moral status by imposing its views on the people; instead, the state
should seek to instill "responsibility"—that is, deliberation about the significance of the
fetus, pregnancy, and abortion. Id. He writes,
If we aim at responsibility, we must leave citizens free, in the end, to decide as
they think right, because that is what moral responsibility entails. If, on the
other hand, we aim at conformity, we deny citizens that decision. We demand
that they act in a way that might be contrary to their own moral convictions, and
we discourage rather than encourage them to develop their own sense of when
and why life is sacred.
Id. Essentially, Dworkin’s insistence that responsibility, as opposed to conformity, should
be the aim of abortion regulations coincides with my argument that a moral pluralism should
be allowed to develop around the fetus. The undue burden standard, then, is the means of
protecting that end.
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While I maintain that the present undue burden standard is operating
illegitimately, I also maintain that this illegitimacy is not an inherent one;116
that is, the categories of undue and due burden need not presuppose the truth
of one claimant’s position. Consider the following: The undue burden
standard might operate more legitimately if, built into the standard, is not a
positive philosophy regarding fetal life, but rather an agnosticism toward fetal
life.117 It is important to clarify that an agnosticism toward fetal life does
not argue that fetuses absolutely do not have an inherently valuable life.
Instead, the agnosticism that I champion asserts that we—those in the
116. Shortly after the Court in Casey announced that the undue burden standard was the
new standard to use when adjudicating the constitutionality of abortion regulations, Metzger
argued that the Court had provided little guidance regarding the methodology for applying
the standard and, as a result, the standard was incapable of protecting the abortion right from
being unnecessarily and unjustifiably burdened by regulations. See Gillian E. Metzger,
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
94 COLUM L. REV. 2025, 2026 (1994) (seeking to "underscore the weakness of the standard
in the form specified by the joint opinion" and "demonstrate[] that the abortion undue burden
standard is virtually unique in its lack of protection against unnecessary and unjustified
burdens on a constitutionally protected right"). Metzger drew upon other areas of
constitutional law—the dormant Commerce Clause; the First Amendment analysis used for
content-neutral, traditional forum speech; and the endorsement test of the Establishment
Clause—to articulate a methodology that might be used to enable the undue burden standard
to provide protection for the abortion right. Id. at 2025. While Metzger’s argument may be
true, and while part of the reason why the undue burden standard is currently unable to
defend the abortion right from being enfeebled by incrementalist regulation is the lack of
methodological guidance offered in Casey, I believe that another important explanation of
the standard’s feebleness is its acceptance of the notion of the fetus as a moral entity with an
always already valuable "life"—that is, the standard has become enervated because
embedded within it, at present, is the assumption that the fetus has a significant moral worth.
Metzger did not address this corruption of the standard; her aim was to look at what was
missing from the standard—not at what was present within it. Accordingly, I offer the
present analysis as a helpful addendum to Metzger’s vital and prescient work.
117. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence parallels the argument that I
make here regarding the undue burden standard. Gey argues that in the free exercise of
religion cases,
The Court does not merely require the political majority to tolerate contrary
views. Rather it affirmatively adopts the amoral position: The government may
not prohibit political, religious, or moral dissent because under our constitutional
system the government is denied the power to endorse one version of truth over
another.
The Establishment Clause is the specific embodiment of this requirement
that the government maintain an agnostic attitude towards religion.
Gey, supra note 74, at 358. With respect to the fetus, the government ought to similarly
adopt the "amoral position," as "the government is denied the power to endorse one version
of [fetal] truth over another." Id. The basis of this argument is not the Establishment
Clause, but rather the importance of the abortion right and the undue burden standard’s
status as an apparatus that balances competing interests.
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anti-abortion/pro-"life" camp, those in the pro-choice movement,
philosophers, theologians, pregnant women, nonpregnant women, lawyers,
state and federal legislators, and importantly, the judiciary—do not know
whether fetuses have an inherently valuable "life." They might; they might
not. In the absence of an answer to this question, the standard that balances
the interests of those who would answer the question differently must not
commit to an answer to the question; indeed, the standard must actively
commit to an acknowledgment that it does not know the answer to the
question.118 An undue burden standard with an agnosticism toward fetal
life, then, would balance the interests of those who believe that fetuses have
meaningful moral value against those who disagree or who prioritize the
morally significant life of the woman and the path that she wants her extant
life to take above the "life" or potential life of the fetus.
If one accepts the proposition that the undue burden standard operates
illegitimately when it proceeds from the assumption that the fetus possesses
an inherently valuable "life," and if one accepts the proposition that the
standard would operate more legitimately if it proceeds with a certain
agnosticism toward fetal life, then one has to reconcile these propositions
with the guidance that the Casey plurality gave when it first enunciated the
undue burden standard. In Casey, the plurality specified that "undue burden
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."119 It continued:
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform
the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest,
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends.120

118. Essentially, the morally agnostic undue burden standard respects the plurality of
moral views concerning the fetus. As such, it will be a hard pill to swallow for those who
"cannot abide the thought of [having] merely one moral view among many," as the law will
not necessarily reflect "their moral outlook." Walen, supra note 110, at 639. And so, the
morally agnostic undue burden standard is a response to "the current of moral
authoritarianism," as it forces would-be moral authoritarians to understand competing moral
positions regarding the fetus not as immoral positions, but rather, truly, competing moral
positions.
119. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
120. Id. (emphasis added).

CAPTURING THE JUDICIARY

957

One can ground the contours of a morally agnostic undue burden
standard in this passage. Here, the Court articulates two components of an
abortion regulation: its purpose and its effect.121 While a legislature may
take a position regarding the moral status of the fetus and regulate abortion
from the assumption that the fetus has/is an inherently valuable "life," this
speaks only to the purpose prong of the analysis. That is, a state may
regulate with the purpose of dissuading women from having abortions and,
thereby, protecting fetal "life."122 However, this purpose may not
121. One scholar has recently conducted an especially insightful exploration of Casey’s
directive that a law places an unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right when it
"‘has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion.’" Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed
"Purpose", 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2566 (2006) [hereinafter After Ayotte] (emphasis
added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). The author argues that although, "[b]y its plain
terms, this is a disjunctive test," the Supreme Court and most lower courts have refused to
analyze abortion regulations’ purposes as distinct from their effects. Id. The author notes
that the Court’s opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong indicated the Court’s awareness of the
possibility of disarticulating legislative purposes from legislative effects. Id. at 2566 (citing
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). In Mazurek, the Court
wrote, "[E]ven assuming . . . that a legislative purpose to interfere with the constitutionally
protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right . . . could render
the . . . law invalid[,] there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative purpose here."
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. "We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when
statutes produce harmful results; much less do we assume it when the results are harmless."
Id. (citations omitted). Although this language appears rather pessimistic on the likelihood
that the Court will ever strike a law based on its unconstitutional purpose, the author remains
hopeful, concluding that Mazurek can "be read as agnostic toward the purpose prong." After
Ayotte, supra at 2566; cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1008 n.19 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s Stenberg concurrence "suggest[s] that even if
the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden . . . , the statute is unconstitutional
because it has the purpose of imposing an undue burden," and that "Ginsburg’s presumption
is . . . squarely inconsistent . . . with our opinion in Mazurek").
The proposal contained within this Article similarly understands as a disjunctive test
Casey’s directive that a law may not have the "purpose or effect" of creating a substantial
obstacle in front of the abortion right. However, unlike the Note discussed above, this
Article’s proposal does not argue that the Court ought to strike laws based on
unconstitutional purposes. Instead, this Article’s proposal removes legislative purposes from
judicial review while providing guidance to the Court seeking to determine whether a law
has unconstitutional effects.
122. In truth, the claim that a state may regulate with the purpose of dissuading women
from undergoing an abortion may actually concede too much. To be sure, Casey explicitly
stated that "an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). One may argue
that this directive prohibits a state from passing regulations with the purpose of deterring
women from having abortion. However, the riposte would be that this statement from Casey
does not prevent states from regulating with the purpose of dissuading women from
abortion; it only prevents states from regulating with the purpose of dissuading women from
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overwhelm a statute’s effects. There are at least two ways for a morally
committed legislature to accomplish this necessary disjunction between its
purposes and a regulation’s effects.
One way is to join a purpose to champion a belief in the moral
consequence of the fetus with an additional purpose that is silent on the
question of the fetus’s moral status. Combining a morally salient purpose
with a morally silent one arguably produces a statute that has a morally
neutral effect. An instructive, but far from obvious, place to look for
understanding this technique is First Amendment case law concerning nude
dancing.
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,123 the Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of an Indiana public indecency statute that
proscribed all forms of complete public nudity and, in so doing, required
would-be nude dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.124 A splintered Court
held that the statute violated neither the dancers’ nor the club proprietors’
rights to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment.125
After finding that nonobscene nude dancing "is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, . . . [but] only marginally
so,"126 the plurality, reviewing the law with a lower level of scrutiny than
the strict scrutiny that it typically used for regulations that infringe upon
protected conduct, found the public indecency statute "justified despite its
abortion when that legislative purpose places a substantial obstacle in front of the abortion
right. Simply put, mere dissuasion does not amount to a substantial obstacle. Moreover,
Casey goes on to explicitly affirm that a state may pass laws "designed to persuade [the
pregnant woman] to choose childbirth over abortion." Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
At any rate, the purpose prong of Casey has gone relatively unexplored, and it ought to
be plumbed for the potential that is has to protect the abortion right from further
diminishment. See Tobin, supra note 36, at 126 (arguing that elucidation of the purpose
prong in Casey has been minimal); see also After Ayotte, supra note 121, at 2569 (arguing
that the purpose prong needs to be explored as it can function to reduce costs on the
judiciary by striking laws that are clearly inconsistent with established precedent).
123. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571–72 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Indiana statute did not violate the dancers’ or club owners’ First
Amendment rights).
124. Id. at 563.
125. Id. at 571–72.
126. Id. at 565–66. Some commentators have emphasized that the Court did not
provide any explanation for its finding that nude dancing was expressive conduct, and if so,
why it was only "marginally" protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Amy Adler,
Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108,
1114 (2005) (noting that "[w]ithout further explanation," the plurality determined that nude
dancing was expressive conduct, but "exiled" it "to this undefined and previously unheard of
‘margin’ of the First Amendment").
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incidental limitations on some expressive activity."127 Furthermore,
Indiana’s interest in protecting the people’s morality, alone, was a
legitimate justification for the law. Citing Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton,128 and Bowers v. Hardwick,129 the plurality wrote, "This and other
public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order.
The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to
provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a
basis for legislation."130
Nine years later in City of Erie v. Pap’s, A.M.,131 the Court was asked,
once again,132 to determine the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania public
indecency ordinance that functioned to require all would-be nude dancers to
don G-strings and pasties.133 Reviewing the statute under the same lower
level of scrutiny that it used in Barnes,134 a plurality held that the ordinance

127. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567.
128. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (upholding a Georgia
statute prohibiting the showing of obscene movies partly on the grounds that the state could
"protect ‘the social interest in order and morality’" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485 (1957))).
129. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute
criminalizing "homosexual sodomy" on the grounds that the state could regulate on "notions
of morality").
130. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion). This
point was emphasized by Justice Scalia, writing in concurrence. Noting that he did not think
that the statute regulated expressive conduct and, accordingly, did not implicate the First
Amendment at all, Justice Scalia argued that the regulation ought to have been reviewed
under a rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, morality
was a rational basis for regulating. See id. at 575 ("Our society prohibits, and all human
societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they
are considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.").
Accordingly, he would have upheld the statute as a rational effort to protect the morality of
the community. See id. at 580 ("Moral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its
prohibition.").
131. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Pennsylvania ordinance did not violate the First Amendment because it
passed the O’Brien test).
132. The lower courts argued that the Barnes decision was splintered in such a way that
no clear precedent could be derived from it. See id. at 285 (quoting the lower court’s
statement that "‘aside from the agreement by a majority of the Barnes Court that nude
dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection, we can find no point on which a
majority of the Barnes Court agreed’" (emphasis added) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap’s,
A.M., 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998))).
133. See id. at 289 (describing the issue before the Court).
134. See id. (affirming that the instant ordinance, like the ordinance at issue in Barnes,
should be reviewed with the less demanding O’Brien test).
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did not violate the First Amendment;135 however, this time, the Court did
not base its decision on the notion that morality alone provided sufficient
grounds for banning public nudity.136 Instead, the Court held that the
statute was a permissible infringement on dancers’ and proprietors’ right to
freedom of expression because the state was justified in seeking to prevent
negative "secondary effects" of nude dancing and nude dancing
establishments.137 In explaining that the ordinance did not have the purpose
of banning the "erotic message" conveyed by nude dancing, but rather had
the purpose of regulating the "secondary effects" of nude dancing, the Court
wrote:
The ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime
and other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult
entertainment establishments like Kandyland . . . . Put another way, the
ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the
expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic
dancing, but rather the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public
health, safety, and welfare, which we have previously recognized are
"caused by the presence of even one such" establishment.138
135. See id. at 296 (concluding that the public indecency ordinance is "justified under
O’Brien").
136. See id. (stating that "public health" and "safety" justified the use of the state’s police
powers). The refusal of the plurality to rest its holding on the state’s interest in morality was
lamented by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. See id. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of
the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed
by the First Amendment.").
137. Id. at 291 (plurality opinion). In his concurrence in Barnes, Justice Souter
presciently championed the view that public indecency statutes like the ones at issue in Barnes
and Pap’s should be upheld under a "secondary effects" rationale. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (writing "separately to . . . [concur] in
the judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of society’s moral views to justify the limitations
at issue, but on the State’s substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult
entertainment establishments"). He partially dissented in Pap’s because he believed that the
plurality, and his earlier concurring opinion in Barnes, erred insofar as neither required the state
to show evidence revealing "the seriousness of the threatened harm or . . . the efficacy of its
chosen remedy." City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 314 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
He blamed his earlier failure in Barnes to demand an evidentiary basis for the regulation at
issue on "[i]gnorance, sir, ignorance." Id. at 316.
138. Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 47–48, 50 (1986)). In the preamble to the ordinance, the council had stated that
the regulation was directed at "nude live entertainment" establishments, whose "‘activity
adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and welfare by providing
an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution,
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.’" Id. at 290
(quoting Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998)). That "nude live
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In resting its decision on the state’s interest in regulating "secondary
effects," the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the claim that morality is a
sufficient, or legitimate, justification for laws that infringe upon recognized
constitutional rights.139
Pap’s suggests that the state may be convinced of the immorality of a
nude body displayed in public. It may, as a consequence, ban public nudity
for the purpose of protecting the moral well-being of the community.
However, in order for a regulation so intended to pass constitutional muster,
its moral purpose must be combined with another, nonmoral purpose—like
the prevention of the violence, criminality, and disease that is thought to be
associated with public nudity. We can begin a productive analogy to
abortion jurisprudence: Consider Casey’s discussion of a rule that requires
women to be informed that "there are procedures and institutions to allow
adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance
if the mother chooses to raise the child herself."140 Such a rule may have
been promulgated by a state convinced that the fetus is/has a "life." It may
have passed the rule with the purpose of likening the fetus to an infant and,
in so doing, convincing the woman that her fetus is a "life." However, in
order for the rule so intended to pass constitutional muster, its moral
purpose must be combined with another, nonmoral purpose—like the
simple intent to make sure women faced with unwanted pregnancies are
entertainment" establishments have such "deleterious effects" on the communities in which
they are situated has been questioned. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 126, at 1125 ("What
exactly is so dangerous about the naked female body? Why make this leap from sexuality to
violence?").
139. See Adler, supra note 126, at 1119 (noting that the rationale offered by the Court
in Pap’s "eclipsed the Barnes plurality’s dubious reliance on morality"). Although the
Court’s holding in Pap’s represents a decided move away from morals-based legislation, it
nevertheless has been criticized by politically liberal commentators. The Pap’s dissenters,
which included Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, argued that the plurality’s acceptance of the
"secondary effects" rationale in the context of a regulation that imposed incidental effects on
speech was novel and improper, as the "secondary effects" doctrine had, until then, only
been used in the context of adjudicating the legality of zoning restrictions. See Pap’s, 529
U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (terming the plurality’s decision a "doctrinal polyglot").
The dissenters also pointed out the seeming illogic in the majority’s reasoning—that is, that
the violence, criminality, and disease that were thought to be an adjunct to nude dancing
establishments could be prevented by requiring dancers to wear G-strings and pasties. See
id. at 323 ("To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any
kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender to
the implausible."). Indeed, the plurality appeared to admit as much. See id. at 301 (plurality
opinion) ("To be sure, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly
reduce these secondary effects, but O’Brien requires only that the regulation further the
interest in combating such effects.").
140. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
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aware of the breadth of their options.141 The combination of the morally
salient purpose with the morally silent one helps to ensure that the
regulation has a morally neutral effect. Indeed, informing women that they
may be entitled to welfare assistance should they decide to carry the
pregnancy to term appears to be a morally neutral piece of advice—saying
very little to nothing at all about the legislature’s beliefs in the moral status
of the fetus.
Yet, combining a morally salient purpose with a morally silent one is
just one technique of ensuring the moral neutrality of a law’s effect. There
is another way to ensure that a state’s intent to champion its moral views
regarding the fetus does not overwhelm a regulation’s effects: If the state
insists upon coercing a woman to hear arguments in favor of understanding
141. Pap’s raises the question of whether the constitutionality of a law ought to depend
on the legitimacy of the state’s motives in passing it. That is, if a state bans public nudity
with the improper purpose of squelching the erotic message that nude dancers communicate,
should the regulation be saved from unconstitutionality if the state can point to a proper
purpose for the regulation—like preventing the negative "secondary effects" of nude dancing
establishments—although that purpose may not have been the actual motivation for the
regulation? The Pap’s plurality answered the question in the affirmative, stating that "this
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
motive." Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 292. The danger in the Court’s holding lies in the possibility
that the state will knowingly infringe First Amendment rights, yet offer a post hoc
rationalization for the infringement that then saves the law from unconstitutionality. See,
e.g., Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: The Constitutionality of Restricting Witness
Speech, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 317 (1996) (arguing that allowing states to proffer "secondary
effects" as a post hoc justification for regulations that infringe upon speech "permits an end
run around the First Amendment: The government can always point to some neutral, nonspeech justification for its action").
The analogous question in the abortion context is whether a regulation should be saved
from unconstitutionality if a morally silent purpose for it could be divined, although the state
might have actually passed the law with a morally salient purpose. For two reasons, the
answer to this must also be an affirmative one. First, a state’s purpose in passing a law does
not overdetermine how it will affect women. Because the morally agnostic undue burden
standard inquires into the moral neutrality of the effects of laws, a state’s intent to convince a
woman that her fetus is/has a "life" by requiring that she be given a list of adoption agencies,
for example, does not translate into women actually hearing the state’s moral message; it
does not translate into the law having the effect of speaking to the fetus’s moral status. The
morally silent purpose of making women aware of the range of options available to them—a
purpose the state may not have had—ensures the quieting of the state’s moral message.
Second, the state’s actual, moral purpose in passing a law ought not to render a statute
unconstitutional because abortion jurisprudence to date suggests that it is absolutely
permissible for a state to regulate abortion with moral purposes. See infra notes 142–46 and
accompanying text (discussing Rust v. Sullivan and Casey, which provide that states may
regulate abortion with moral purposes). To ensure the moral neutrality of the effects of laws
passed with moral purposes, however, the state must present both sides of the moral debate.
This is the argument that I next develop. See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text
(suggesting a new standard).

CAPTURING THE JUDICIARY

963

the fetus as a "life," then the state should be required to also provide
information regarding alternative moral views. If both sides of the debate
regarding the fetus’s moral status are presented, one can conclude that the
regulation has a morally neutral effect.
Casey, together with the Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan,142
intimate that a legislature need not be reserved when advocating its moral
views of the fetus—that is, that a state need not always combine a morally
salient purpose with a morally silent one in order to save a regulation from
unconstitutionality. Indeed, Rust and Casey suggest that the state may
openly promote its beliefs in fetal "life." When upholding a federal
regulation that prohibited recipients of Title X funds from providing
abortions, abortion counseling, or referrals to abortion providers—and, in
the course of so doing, restricted the ability of the indigent women who rely
upon the recipients of Title X funds to elect an abortion—the majority in
Rust, citing Maher v. Roe,143 wrote that "the government may ‘make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that
judgment . . . .’"144 Furthermore, in Casey, the plurality explained that "a
state measure designed to persuade [the pregnant woman] to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to" the state’s
goal of expressing "profound" respect of the fetus;145 moreover, "[e]ven in
the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations
designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing
the pregnancy to full term."146 However, while a state may "make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion" and inform a woman about
"philosophic and social arguments of great weight" that may counsel her to
bring her pregnancy to term, the Court has never held that the state may do
this to the exclusion of informing a woman about "philosophic and social
arguments of great weight" concerning the sociogenesis of the fetus as a
"life."147 The Court has never argued that the state must not inform a
142. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (concluding that regulations
restricting the use of federal funds to fund abortions do not violate "the First or Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution").
143. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that Connecticut did not
violate the Constitution by refusing to fund nontherapeutic abortions).
144. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting Roe, 432 U.S. at 474).
145. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
146. Id. at 872–73.
147. In Rust, the majority argued that the abortion rights of indigent women were not
violated by the state’s refusal to allocate funds to enable them to actually procure
abortions—although the refusal effectively precluded poor women from exercising any
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woman that "reasonable people, throughout the centuries, have disagreed"
about the truth of those weighty "philosophic and social arguments . . . that
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term."148
The state convinced of fetal "life" must present both sides of the argument
if the regulation is not to corrupt the space of moral pluralism that should
surround the exercise of an important right; indeed, the state convinced of
fetal "life" must present both sides of the debate if abortion jurisprudence is
abortion rights that they may have. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. The Court said, "In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund
one activity to the exclusion of the other." Id. at 193. This statement may be read to imply
that the state may also promote one viewpoint (i.e., the fetus is/has a "life") to the exclusion
of others (i.e., the moral status of the fetus is unknown and is subject to debate, the fetus is
only "potential life," etc.). However, the Rust majority was careful to limit its holding to the
specific context of Title X; it took pains to articulate that women remained wholly free to
receive abortions, abortion counseling, and abortion referrals from non-Title X providers.
See id. at 203 ("Under the Secretary’s regulations, however, a doctor’s ability to provide, and
a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services
outside the context of the Title X project remains unfettered." (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 475 (1977))). The distinction between negative rights and positive rights was
paramount in the decision. See id. at 193 ("There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy."). Accordingly, it does not follow that, outside of the
Title X context, the state may encourage one viewpoint of the fetus over another. That is,
although the state may have no affirmative duty to help women realize their rights, the state
nevertheless may not interfere in the exercise of rights—by championing one view of the
fetus over another. Moreover, if Casey allows the state to so interfere by allowing women to
be told of "philosophic and social argument of great weight that can be brought to bear in
favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term," then the interference must be impartial;
women must be informed of alternative arguments.
148. Gey makes an interesting argument concerning this point. He writes,
[I]f a woman has a right to determine for herself the attributes of personhood
that attach to the fetus, it is inconsistent to uphold legislation intended to ensure
that a woman makes her moral decision about abortion in a "thoughtful and
informed" manner, and that she takes into account all the "philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing her
pregnancy to full term."
Gey, supra note 74, at 363 n.171 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 872). Certainly, the state
denies the woman the full opportunity to decide which attributes of personhood that she
believes attaches to the fetus when it gives only a partial survey of the "philosophic and
social arguments of great weight" pertaining to the fetus. Accordingly, I argue that, instead
of denying a state interested in protecting fetal "life" the opportunity to present arguments
that favor the continuation of a pregnancy, the state may do so only if such arguments are in
addition to a presentation of arguments that do not lead her to continue her pregnancy
because of a moral imperative demanded by the fetus’s status as a moral entity. As such, a
more generous review of the "philosophic and social arguments of great weight" spoken of
by Justice O’Connor would not function to "manipulate the moral decisions of pregnant
women" in the way that Gey fears. Id.
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to be consistent with Lawrence and the developments in First Amendment
Law, both counseling that the state may not legitimately impose its morality
on its subjects.149
In sum, when a regulation is challenged, the morally agnostic undue
burden standard can be used to determine if, in practice, the morally
committed legislature succeeded in creating law that was sufficiently
morally agnostic in its effect. If the effect of the law shows a commitment
to a moral position regarding the fetus—because it has a sole purpose to
convince a woman about the propriety of the state’s views regarding the
fetus’s moral status, or because it champions one view regarding the fetus
to the exclusion of other views—an agnostic undue burden standard must
strike it down.150
As such, a legislature, convinced of the always already "life" and
consequent moral value of the fetus may have the purpose of "creat[ing] a
structural mechanism that express[es] profound respect for the life of the
unborn"; however, that structural mechanism must not show the state’s
149. See Adler, supra note 126, at 1119 n.52 ("Morality has always been a problematic
justification of banning speech; it has become even more so in light of the Court’s decision
to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick [with Lawrence], on which the Barnes plurality had
partially relied." (citations omitted)).
150. Other scholars have proposed an undue burden standard that disaggregates the
purpose of a regulation from its effects. See Gey, supra note 74, at 391 (arguing that, when
reviewing an abortion regulation, the Court should determine if a regulation has a "primarily
amoral purpose," as well as a "substantially amoral effect"); Metzger, supra note 116, at
2043–44 (arguing that the undue burden standard should reflect the dormant Commerce
Clause standard insofar as the latter’s two-tiered approach provides insight as to how judges
could examine unduly burdensome purpose and effects); id. at 2044 (noting that "[i]n
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the illegitimate purpose is economic protectionism and
discrimination," while "in the abortion context, it is the intentional creation of substantial
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking to abort a nonviable fetus"); id. at 2045 (noting that
in the effects prong of both dormant Commerce Clause analysis and the undue burden
standard, "increased costs and delays, even if incidental, may prove to be undue burdens");
cf. Appleton, supra note 99, at 62–63 (arguing that a regulation’s purpose and effects should
be considered together); id. at 62 ("[I]f an anti-abortion purpose alone spelled invalidity, the
[Casey] opinion could not have cited . . . Justice O’Connor’s previous dissents, which
regularly ignored a statute’s anti-abortion purposes to focus instead on the absence of an
undue burden according to the law’s effects."); id. at 62–63 (arguing that if anti-abortion
effects alone determined invalidity, it would make the undue-burden test "unnecessarily
problematic" because it "would implicate a wide range of decisions . . . that have unintended
effects and consequences"); id. at 63 ("While the abortion-funding cases virtually conceded
the anti-abortion purposes underlying the selective funding schemes they upheld, the cases
emphasized the absence of any cognizable effect on the challengers.").
While other scholars have argued that a regulation might have unduly burdensome
purposes or unduly burdensome effects, this instant proposal is the first to suggest a
disarticulation of the moral purpose of a regulation from its moral effects.
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metaphorical cards so to speak, as the effect of the mechanism must do no
more than to clear a space for the woman’s contemplation of fetal life.151
Accordingly, the regulation must say nothing at all about fetal "life" (at
least ostensibly), or it must present arguments both for and against
according a moral status to the fetus. A morally agnostic undue burden
standard, then, would determine whether the regulation is morally neutral in
practice and as experienced by women. Differently stated, the rehabilitated
standard proposed herein would simply determine if a law has the effect of
providing women with a morally neutral occasion for reflection.
Accordingly, the undue burden standard that I propose would tell the
following story: The standard was a compromise—between a social
movement that champions the belief that the fetus has a significant moral
status and that this status should determine the telos of a pregnancy and a
social movement that disputes this moral status and/or disputes that the
fetus’s moral status should determine the course of a woman’s pregnancy.
While the state could proceed from the assumption that the fetus has a
moral status and pass regulations that express profound respect for the
morally significant "life of the fetus," the undue burden standard, however,
will review these regulations with an eye towards determining whether they
have unconstitutionally corrupted the space of moral pluralism that ought to
surround the abortion decision. The nuance here is crucial: While state or
federal legislatures can hold a particular view of the moral status of the
fetus, the judiciary, armed with and deploying the undue burden standard,
must ensure that that view has not corrupted the ability of the woman to
decide upon her fetus’s moral status and that status’s implication for her
immediate pregnancy. In so doing, the morally agnostic undue burden
standard would patrol the space of moral pluralism that ought to surround
the fetus and abortion, more generally.
B. The Present Undue Burden Standard, Redux
A morally agnostic undue burden standard, then, would ask
different questions than the present undue burden standard. Where the
current standard asks, Does this regulation excessively express profound
respect for fetal life, or does it express this profound respect
moderately?, a morally agnostic standard would ask, Does this
151. See Appleton, supra note 99, at 67 (arguing that "the goal of the restrictions
upheld in Casey is not to decrease abortion but rather simply to push women to think longer
and harder about abortion").
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regulation do no more than clear a space wherein a woman can
deliberate as to whether her fetus is an inherently valuable life and, if so,
whether she can live with a decision to terminate it? The former set of
questions distorts the terms of the compromise that the Supreme Court
aimed to strike by putting forth the undue burden standard; the latter set
better acknowledges competing moral worldviews involved in the
abortion debate.
Furthermore, when one understands the substance of the questions
that comprise the present, morally committed undue burden standard—
when one understands that the Court is looking into the zeal with which
a regulation expresses its profound respect for the always already
valuable "life" of the fetus—one can see that the undue burden standard
in its present deployment is fundamentally different from other
standards used by the Supreme Court. That is, although the undue
burden standard looks and sounds like an objective constitutional test,
the questions asked by the illegitimately operating, present undue
burden standard are vividly different than those asked by other
constitutional standards.152 Consider this: What if, when employing
152. It is important to note that I am not arguing that the undue burden standard is the
incorrect standard to utilize in abortion jurisprudence—that some other standard, like strict
scrutiny or a more robust intermediate scrutiny, is more appropriate. Other scholars have
competently made such cases. See, e.g., id. at 53 (noting that the undue burden standard "is
a balance that, while favoring the government more than the balance fashioned by Roe v.
Wade, nevertheless offers more hope to challengers than traditional rational-basis review").
Metzger has similarly contemplated the appropriate level of scrutiny that the undue burden
standard ought to represent, contending that while it may appear that the undue burden
standard is equivalent to an intermediate scrutiny, it is, in practice, more akin to a rational
basis review. She states that "Casey’s reference to substantial obstacles as unconstitutional,
and its emphasis on balancing the interests of the state and the pregnant woman, might
suggest that the Court is now applying a form of intermediate scrutiny." Metzger, supra
note 116, at 2032. However,
This conclusion seems unlikely given the use of rationality review to examine
regulations imposing burdens not considered to be substantial obstacles. It is
particularly noteworthy that Casey appeared to allow states to impose
restrictions on abortion not amounting to undue burdens in order to achieve a
legitimate interest, as opposed to the important or substantial state interest
requirement usually employed under intermediate scrutiny.
Id. at 2032–33.
Rather than debating whether the undue burden standard is no more than a form of
rational basis scrutiny or a failed attempt at intermediate scrutiny, I am silent as to the tier of
scrutiny represented by the undue burden standard; similarly, I am silent about what tier of
scrutiny the undue burden standard ought to be. Instead, I simply contend that, as currently
deployed, the standard embodies an ideological bias and, consequently, cannot do the job
that it was designed, and ought, to do.

968

67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010)

strict scrutiny the Court asked not whether a regulation pursued a
"compelling interest," but rather whether the regulation pursued a
"morally righteous interest"?153 When constructed in such a way, the
(corrupted) test would overdetermine the results in any given instance.
Within such a test, it is unlikely that a state’s interest in "diversity"
would be "morally righteous" enough to amount to a compelling state
interest;154 the protection of fetal "life," on the contrary, would likely
satisfy the demands of "moral righteousness." This example aims to
show how the undue burden standard’s reflection of a moral perspective
compromises its legitimacy as a constitutional test. While rational basis
scrutiny might allow for the state to regulate morality, a moral position
is not built into the test itself. While strict scrutiny might disallow the
state from regulating morality, again, a moral position is not built into
the test itself. However, a moral position is part and parcel of the
present undue burden standard. The nuance here is crucial, as it reveals
the present undue burden standard to be a judicial innovation—and a
problematic one.
The argument that the present undue burden standard embodies an
ideological bias does not lead to the conclusion that it is necessarily
unjust, but rather that it is operating unjustly as it is currently deployed.
Further, my argument is not that the standard is practically unworkable;
indeed, in the next Part, I will show exactly how a morally agnostic
version would function.
Moreover, the reconceptualization that I propose should not lead to
the conclusion, popular in older versions of critical legal theory
(especially theory coming out of the school of Critical Legal Studies),
that the ideological bias locatable in the present undue burden standard
evidences a characteristic that is common to all legal standards: It is
raw power, rather than objective reasoning, that determines both how
constitutional and other legal tests will be deployed as well as the results
of that deployment, in any given instance. This line of argumentation
153. Admittedly, within First Amendment jurisprudence, the tests employed by the
Court tend to, at least, sound as if they have a moral-commitment; that is, they tend to invite
the judges to determine constitutionality based on the judges’ personally held senses of what
is moral versus what is immoral. See Gey, supra note 74, at 338 ("[T]he Court has marked
the line between protected and unprotected speech by reference to vague, value-laden terms
such as ‘prurient interest,’ ‘patent offensiveness,’ and ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.’").
154. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR
ULTRASOUND 1 (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_RFU.pdf.
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holds that the present, illegitimate undue burden standard is one
particular instantiation of an illegitimacy common to all categories; that
is, that all standards embody a claimant’s version of truth. This is
because it is raw power that produces the standards in the first instance,
or, in the second instance, that determines how they will be used. The
argument would continue: With regard to the undue burden standard as
currently deployed, it just so happens that the pro-"life"/anti-abortion
camp has used its political power to embed its ideology regarding the
fetus into the constitutional standard. This line of argumentation would
go on to argue that if the morally agnostic undue burden standard that I
champion were to be accepted by the Supreme Court, it would not
change the fact that raw, political power will have determined the
standard and its operation; in the case of the morally agnostic version of
the standard, the pro-choice camp would have "captured the Judiciary"
and embedded its ideology about the fetus’s (lack of) consequential
moral status into the constitutional test.155 But the morally agnostic
undue burden standard that I propose does not embody any version of
truth; accordingly, it does not, and should not, reflect the belief that the
fetus is not a "life" or is not an entity with moral worth. Rather, the
morally agnostic undue burden standard holds no position regarding the
moral status of the fetus. If it embodies any truth, it is the truth that one
does not know, and may not ever know whether or not the fetus is a
moral subject.
Having laid out the contours of a morally agnostic undue burden
standard, how then would that standard operate? In the next Part, I
apply the standard that I have proposed to several abortion regulations.
As the constitutionality of these laws is litigated, it may give the
Supreme Court the occasion in upcoming terms to articulate how the
undue burden standard might legitimately operate.
IV. The Morally Agnostic Undue Burden Standard in Action
A. Mandatory Ultrasound Laws
Mandatory ultrasound laws range in levels of coerciveness. The least
coercive laws simply require that a woman be given either written or verbal
155. Cf. Gey, supra note 74, at 332 (arguing that the "logical consequence of a virtually
unrestrained ‘moral’ political process" is "that constitutional theory must become the servant
of political power").
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information about where she can obtain an ultrasound;156 the most coercive
laws require that a woman be given an ultrasound as well as a description of
the image.157 At present, nineteen states have some form of an ultrasound
requirement.158
Oklahoma’s mandatory ultrasound law is one of the most severe. And
while the law was recently struck down as a violation of the Oklahoma
constitution’s requirement that laws contain "single subjects,"159 the
Oklahoma legislature is considering re-passing the law in a form that is
consistent with the single subject rule.160 For these reasons, it is instructive
to look at the recently invalidated law, as it likely indicates what mandatory
ultrasound laws will look like in the future. The law provided that a
physician "shall,"
1.

Perform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman, using
either a vaginal transducer or an abdominal transducer,
whichever would display the embryo or fetus more clearly;

2.

Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is
depicting;

3.

Display the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may
view them; [and]

4.

Provide a medical description of the ultrasound images, which
shall include the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the
presence of cardiac activity, if present and viewable, and the
presence of external members and internal organs, if present
and viewable . . . .161

This act probably would pass constitutional muster under the present
undue burden standard. That is, the act can be justified as a legitimate
exercise of a state interested in expressing "profound respect" for fetal
156. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 1.
157. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b (2009) (repealed 2010) (stating the provision).
158. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 2 (listing states’ ultrasound
requirements). These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id.
159. Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Oklahoma Supreme Court Finds
Abortion Law Unconstitutional, Upholds State District Court Decision (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/oklahoma-supreme-court-finds-abortion-lawunconstitutional-upholds-state-district-court-d (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. See id. (explaining Oklahoma’s possible restructuring of the law).
161. Tit. 63 § 1-738.3b.
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"life." Oklahoma can persuasively argue that compelling a doctor to relate
to the woman the raw, objective biological data about the fetus that she
carries furthers the state’s interest in fetal life. Indeed, Oklahoma can point
to language in Casey itself, finding constitutionally permissible state
informed consent requirements that women be given "truthful,
nonmisleading information"—including, but not limited to, information
about the "‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus."162 Oklahoma can argue
that its law does no more than provide gloss on the significance of the
fetus’s "probable gestational age" by detailing the physical properties, like
cardiac activity and developed internal organs, that the fetus has by virtue
of its probable gestational age. Oklahoma may even argue that, not only
does the law fail to impose a substantial obstacle in a woman’s path to an
abortion, it imposes no obstacle at all. How could factual information
about an image, an image away from which a woman may avert her eyes,163
amount to an obstacle? My aim in presenting this line of argumentation is
not to contend that it is convincing; rather, my aim is to demonstrate that
the argumentation is only convincing under an undue burden standard that
proceeds from the assumption that the fetus has/is a "life" and that the only
question is how much protection a state can permissibly afford that "life."
What would be the disposition of such a law under an undue burden
standard that was morally agnostic toward the question of fetal life? The
Oklahoma law would likely be found constitutionally infirm under such a
reconceptualized standard.
However, the unconstitutionality of the
regulation would not be based on the argument that the state subscribed to a
notion of fetal "life" and passed the law for the purpose of protecting it. As
mentioned earlier, within an agnostic undue burden standard, it is legitimate
for the state to regulate with the purpose of expressing respect for morally
significant fetal "life"—as long as a morally silent purpose can also be
divined, or as long as the state requires the women to hear both sides of the
debate regarding the moral status of the fetus.164 And so, statements
surrounding the passage of the act that suggest that its purpose was to
promote a view of "life" would not be dispositive on the question of
162. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b(C) (2009) (repealed 2010). The provision invites
questions as to the permissibility of other forms of refusal that are not expressly "allowed"
by the law. May a woman view the ultrasound screen, but plug her ears while her doctor
gives a "medical description of the ultrasound image," thereby allowing herself the
opportunity to interpret for herself the image being projected? May she avert her eyes and
plug her ears?
164. See supra Part III (discussing the morally agnostic undue burden standard).
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constitutionality.165 Rather, the Court should look at the act in practice and
determine whether the effect of its requirements is to corrupt the space of
moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion decision.166 It is
difficult to sustain the position that forcing a woman to view an ultrasound
image of her fetus does not have the effect of imposing a view of the moral
status of the fetus as an inherently valuable "life." That is, a Court
employing a morally agnostic undue burden standard would have to strike
down mandatory ultrasound viewing laws because of the work that such
laws do to force upon the woman a particular idea about fetal "life."
Professor Carol Sanger’s scholarship in this area is instructive.167
First, Sanger disputes the notion that the image produced by ultrasound
technology is neutral and objective, that it possesses no ideological
predilection whatsoever.168 Instead, this visual representation of the fetus
165. Accordingly, the Court should not give dispositive weight to statements made
during legislative debates both for and against the passage of the act. Nor could the Court
give dispositive weight to statements made to constituents or to media, like those made by a
supporter of the bill, Senator Todd Lamb. When asked why he supported passage of the bill,
Senator Lamb responded, "‘I introduced the bill because I wanted to encourage life in
society. In Oklahoma, society is on the side of life.’" Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma Sued over
New Abortion Ultrasound Law, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 11, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/11/MN4O13F09F.DTL&type=health (last visited Sept. 24,
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. Accordingly, the Court might give great weight to the provision in the Oklahoma
law that legally exempts from penalty a woman who refuses to look at the ultrasound screen
during the coerced ultrasound. The clause provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the ultrasound images
required to be provided to and reviewed with her. Neither the physician nor the pregnant
woman shall be subject to any penalty if she refuses to look at the presented ultrasound
images." Tit. 63 § 1-738.3b(C). This provision is particularly fascinating because it
functions to disavow any claims that the coerced ultrasound is morally neutral, objective,
and dispassionate. If the biological and visual data related by a doctor to the woman saddled
with an unwanted pregnancy were strictly within the realm of impartiality, a woman might
not feel the need to refuse to look; that the legislature knew of the radical partiality of the
mere "information" forced upon a woman is evident in its felt need to expressly provide that
a woman and her doctors would escape penalties if she averts her eyes. A reviewing Court
may use this clause as evidence that there is something ideologically charged, and
impermissibly so, about forcing women to undergo and view an ultrasound prior to an
abortion. In essence, the effect of the regulation is to promote an impermissible view of fetal
"life."
167. See generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and
Believing] (discussing mandatory ultrasounds and their impact on abortion laws).
168. See id. at 380 ("To be sure, the sonogram itself has no point of view—it is a
photograph—and on this account it is offered up as an objective datum incapable of bias.")
The preamble to Alabama’s mandatory ultrasound viewing law—notably, the "Woman’s
Right to Know Act"—is representative of this notion, offering fetal imaging as nothing more
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has a cultural context; it is a context in which excited expectant mommies
get their first ultrasounds169 and morally significant persons get their photos
taken.170 Moreover, the woman seeking an abortion—a social being, after
all—brings an extant cultural knowledge to her viewing of the ultrasound
that makes impossible any dispassionate or detached understanding of the
image.171 The result is that the "simple" photograph of the fetus functions
to make a powerful argument about the fetus’s moral status: The fetus
becomes a "life."172 "[T]he ultrasound is meant to establish or simply to
reinforce the state’s position that the fetus is not just ‘potential life’ . . . but
‘actual life,’ with all the ideological and emotional force that word now
comprises and exerts."173 By "cleverly and cruelly capitaliz[ing] on the
socialized meaning of fetal imagery,"174 mandatory viewing laws
compromise the space of moral pluralism that should surround the status of
the fetus because they have the effect of "insisting that women take a
particular view of fetal existence."175 Understanding this, a Court

than neutral and objective information. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-2 (2002). It reads:
The decision to abort is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion are serious and can be lasting or life threatening. . . . [I]t is the purpose
of this chapter to ensure that every woman considering an abortion receives
complete information on the procedure, risks, and her alternatives and to ensure
that every woman who submits to an abortion procedure does so only after
giving her voluntary and informed consent to the abortion procedure.
Id.
169. See Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 167, at 382 ("Mandatory ultrasound
laws require women to participate physically in what has become a rite of full-term
pregnancy: the first ultrasound.").
170. See id. at 379 ("[T]he technology and the practice of ultrasound have transformed
the fetus from potential life to something that can have its picture taken, a trait which in our
visual culture is as close to a marker of personhood as one can get.").
171. See id. ("Preexisting cultural familiarity with the public fetus and its status as an
independent person, patient, and consumer has made affinity with one’s own fetus an easy
and natural next step.").
172. See id. at 406 ("[T]he imagery is rarely neutral, or at least rarely received as
neutral. For some it powerfully represents nothing less than life.").
173. Id. at 377. Moreover, not only is the fetus a "life," but it is also a baby—the
aborting woman’s baby. See id. at 378 ("[T]hese statutes are unabashedly meant to
transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially
aborting mother."). Through compelling a woman to view her ultrasound, she is encouraged
to comprehend her abortion as killing her baby.
174. Id. at 406.
175. Id. at 408.
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reviewing such statutes with an agnostic undue burden standard must strike
them down as unconstitutional.
An agnostic undue burden standard would compel those desiring to
protect fetal "life" to pursue their purpose with more ideologically neutral
means or in ways that would not impose their moral worldviews on women
or physicians. Accordingly, a potentially permissible version of the
Oklahoma statute and other mandatory viewing laws might provide that a
woman seeking abortion services be given the option of receiving an
ultrasound and having the image described to her. Moreover, these laws
might be saved from unconstitutionality if it provided that women "shall"
also receive information about the fetus that proceeds from different
assumptions. Accordingly, subsequent (or prior) to an ultrasound in which
a physician provides a "medical description" of the image, a woman might
also be informed that the image is not dispositive of fetal "life." She might
be given information about how the biological fact of the fetus has become
conceptualized as coincident with an idea of morally significant "life." She
might be engaged in a discussion about how varying schools of thought
throughout history have held differing views regarding the beginning of
"life."176 She might be encouraged to consider that it is she, ultimately, who
must reconcile her own personally held views regarding "life" with her
decision to terminate or continue her present pregnancy. An abortion
regulation that compels the woman to engage in a conversation regarding
"life" that is not overdetermined—that presents the belief that "life" begins
at conception together with the belief that "life" is a vapid term that has
been co-opted by a social movement that is not empowered to determine the
origins of morally significant "life"—would not likely fall into the category
of an unduly burdensome regulation. Such a conversation is congruent with
an agnosticism toward fetal life.
It is important to mention that the conversation that I have described
may ultimately persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion, as she
may become convinced that her fetus is a "life" and that the fact of fetal
"life" prohibits her from terminating her pregnancy. Indeed, the state may
have enacted the regulation that provides an opportunity for such a
conversation with the purpose of ultimately persuading a woman to come to
this conclusion. However, the state may not coerce women to reach such
176. The history given in Roe might be an instructive launching pad for such a
discussion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–47 (1973) (examining approaches taken to
abortion in "ancient attitudes," "The Hippocratic Oath," "the common law," "English
statutory law," "American law," "the position of the American Medical Association," and
"the position[s] of the American Public Health," and "American Bar Association[s]").
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conclusions by providing them with only one side of the relevant debate.
Accordingly, the state must present all arguments surrounding questions of
fetal life. Moreover, it is through the presentation of such arguments—a
presentation that clears a space for the flourishing of moral pluralism
around the question of the fetus—that the state may, legitimately, express
its "profound respect" for the fetus.
B. Fetal Pain Laws
As of September 2009, nine states had passed fetal pain laws, which
require that women be told that their fetuses are capable of feeling pain.177
Georgia’s statute is representative, requiring that women be informed that,
By 20 weeks’ gestation, the unborn child has the physical structures
necessary to experience pain. There is evidence that by 20 weeks’
gestation unborn children seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner
which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a response to
pain. Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who are
20 weeks gestational age or older who undergo prenatal surgery.178

Fetal pain laws are problematic for many reasons, the most important
one being that they may be misleading. In a helpful analysis, Harper Tobin
describes how each of the statements that abortion providers must relate to
their patients under these laws could mislead the lay hearer into believing
that the scientific community has reached the conclusion that the fetus feels
pain during an abortion procedure.179 She notes that simply because the
structures necessary for pain perception are in place, "their mere presence is
insufficient," as they are not fully functional at early gestational ages.180
She notes that while fetuses may demonstrate "evasive responses
superficially suggestive of pain," there is considerable debate that "pain is
actually experienced."181 Finally, she notes that while "anesthesia is
routinely administered to" fetuses undergoing prenatal surgery, the
anesthesia serves purposes completely unrelated to preventing the fetus
177. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 2. The federal
government considered, but failed to pass a similar bill in 2006. See Unborn Child Pain
Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006) (stating the proposed legislation).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2006).
179. Tobin, supra note 36, at 147.
180. Id. at 144.
181. Id. at 146.
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from feeling pain, including "inhibiting fetal movement during a [medical]
procedure," allowing access to the fetus, and preventing contractions and
separation of the placenta.182
Moreover, the quasi-truthful, yet nevertheless misleading information
that Georgia requires a woman to hear unconstitutionally communicates the
state’s message about the fetus’s moral status. The ability of an entity to
feel pain—that is, that a thing is a sentient being—invariably speaks to the
moral status of the entity, as well as the respect and deference that ought to
be afforded to it. The misrepresentation of the sentient capacities of the
fetus accordingly misrepresents information that is relevant to the question
of the fetus’s moral status. Again, this is something that the state may not
do. The woman seeking an abortion must be left a space, free of
intentionally misleading information,183 to contemplate her fetus’s moral
status and the consequences of that status on her decision to terminate her
pregnancy. Under an agnostic undue burden standard, misinformation of
the kind mandated by Georgia unconstitutionally contracts that space.
C. Declaratory Laws
An interesting crop of abortion regulations are those that declare the
fetus’s moral status. At present, only South Dakota184 and North Dakota185
have passed such laws. Both regulations require that, as part of the
informed consent process, women be told that the abortion procedure to
which they are endeavoring to consent will "terminate the life of a whole,

182. Id. at 147 (quoting Susan L. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary
Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 952 (2005)).
183. Jeremy Blumenthal has done provocative work on how the stressful conditions
involved in seeking abortion services (and, simply, bearing an unwanted pregnancy) may
leave persons in a vulnerable state and less inclined to be critical towards the information
communicated to them; that is, persons are more easily persuaded when they are
experiencing negative emotional states. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion,
and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83
WASH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2008) (explaining the findings). He concludes, "[E]ven a truthful
message may be misleading when it inappropriately takes advantage of emotional influence
to bias an individual’s decision away from the decision that would be made in a nonemotional, fully informed state." Id. at 27. He suggests that "the sort of emotional
information that many States now provide in their ‘informed consent’ statutes can lead to
such inappropriate emotional influence and thus should be examined more closely than
heretofore." Id.
184. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009).
185. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-02 (2009).
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separate, unique, living human being."186 South Dakota’s law also requires
that women be told that "the pregnant woman has an existing relationship
with that unborn human being and that the relationship enjoys protection
under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South
Dakota."187 In the challenge to South Dakota’s law, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction.188 When comparing the South Dakota
provision to the informed consent provision found constitutional in Casey,
the court stated,
Unlike the truthful, nonmisleading medical and legal information
doctors were required to disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute
requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State’s viewpoint on an
unsettled medical, philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that is,
whether a fetus is a human being.189

The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, overruled, however, finding that
"‘human being’ in this case means ‘an individual living member of the
species of Homo sapiens . . . during [its] embryonic [or] fetal age."190
Essentially, the court found that there was no ideological bias or theological
underpinnings beneath the pronouncement that abortion terminates the "life
of a . . . living human being."191
186. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-02
(2009).
187. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009).
188. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889
(D.S.D. 2005).
189. Id.
190. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir.
2008). This definition of "human being" was found in a different section of the South Dakota
code. Id. at 727. Women were not required to be given this statutory definition;
consequently, women, in practice, would only hear the statement that abortion terminates the
life of a "whole, separate, unique, living human being"—a statement that is reasonably
interpreted as "address[ing] whether the embryo or fetus is a ‘whole, separate, unique’
‘human life’ in the metaphysical sense." Id. at 736 n.9. As Post explains:
A reasonable patient, upon being informed that she is terminating the life of a
"human being," would not understand her doctor to be informing her that she is
ending the life of a biological member of the species Homo sapiens. She would
understand her doctor to be informing her that she is ending the life of a member
of the human community who otherwise deserves life. Because this is the
meaning that the term "human being" carries in debates about abortion, this is
the way that the doctor’s speech will be received and understood.
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 958.
191. Planned Parenthood Minn., 530 F.3d at 726. The dissent notes that the term
"human being" is subject to multiple meanings; while it may "refer to purely biological
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A Supreme Court deploying an undue burden standard with agnostic
commitments might find the circuit court’s reasoning a bit disingenuous. It
might argue that "life" and "living human being" have been co-opted by a
social movement that seeks to endow those words and concepts with
meaning that goes beyond a purely biological definition.192 Moreover, the
Court might advise legislatures considering similar language for their
state’s informed consent processes that it may save such regulations from
unconstitutionality if women were also presented a differing ideological
view of fetal "life" (i.e., that the fetus is a biological entity whose
ontological status as a morally significant "life" is unresolved), or if those
informed consent processes make clear that they were referring to
biological life as opposed to a theological/moral notion of "life" (i.e.,
physicians should explain that the abortion procedure "terminates the
existence of a member of the species of Homo sapiens during its embryonic
or fetal age").193 Simply stated, declaratory laws like those of South and
North Dakota impose upon the woman a particular conception of the moral
status of the fetus and would be struck down by a Court employing an
agnostic undue burden standard.
D. Casey-Like Informed Consent Requirements
The informed consent requirements that were found constitutional in
Casey, mandating that women be informed about the nature of the abortion
procedure,194 the health risks attendant to abortion and childbirth, and the
characteristics"—denoting a "bipedal mammal that is anatomically related to the great
apes"—it "also may be a value judgment, indicating entitlement to the moral or political
rights shared by all persons." Id. at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting). In profound disagreement
with the majority’s conclusion that there is no ideological foundation beneath the
pronouncement that "abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being," the dissent wrote, "In the context of abortion, the term ‘human being’ has an
overwhelmingly subjective, normative meaning, in some sense encompassing the whole
philosophical debate about the procedure." Id.
192. See Dresser, supra note 63, at 1615 (noting that the law in South Dakota "is
seeking to impose consent demands that are . . . more unconventional, by requiring doctors
to give women one position on the moral status of the developing fetus—a position not
shared by many people in the United States").
193. See id. at 1622 ("If the government requires women to receive material about the
moral value of developing human life, that material should describe the range of views
people have on the topic.").
194. Of course, there are multiple ways to describe an abortion procedure—some more
emotionally charged and morally committed than others. The description of the abortion
procedure that women hear ought to be one that proceeds from a morally agnostic view of
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probable gestational age of the fetus, would likely pass constitutional
muster under a morally agnostic undue burden standard.195 While they
were probably passed by a legislature convinced of the significant moral
status of the fetus, and while they were almost certainly passed with the
purpose of convincing women to carry their fetuses to term, these purposes
are not patently revealed in the effect of the statute. On their face, such
informed consent requirements seem to do nothing more than supply
women with enough information about their pregnancies and the abortion
process such that the decisions that they make to end their pregnancies are
sufficiently informed.196 Likewise, requiring that abortion providers give
the fetus; accordingly, as a baseline, it must be vigilant in its use of medical terminology.
For example, a woman should be told that her "cervix will be dilated so that the physician
can insert a vacuum aspirator into the uterus; thereafter, a suction will be used to empty the
contents of the uterus"; she should not be told that her "cervix will be dilated so that the
physician can insert a ‘vacuum’ into the ‘womb’ and suck the ‘baby’ out."
195. Moreover, the informed consent requirements that were struck down in Akron,
requiring physicians to inform their patients that "the unborn child is a human life from the
moment of conception," would likely be found unconstitutional under an agnostic undue
burden standard; such a statement, purporting to describe as fact "one theory of when life
begins," undoubtedly constricts the space of moral pluralism around the fertilized egg, the
embryo, and the fetus. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5,
444 (1983) (describing the statements required under the informed consent law). For the
same reasons, such statements would be unconstitutional even if only found in the preamble
to a state Act—even if they were not required to be expressed directly to a woman burdened
with an unwanted pregnancy. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504, 506
(1989) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of a Missouri act’s preamble, which stated
that "the life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being"). Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent in
Webster, would have struck down the preamble because of his belief that it would have "the
unconstitutional effect of chilling the exercise of a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy
and of burdening the freedom of health professionals to provide abortion services." Id. at
539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although a Court employing an agnostic undue burden
standard would reach the same result as Justice Blackmun, the rationale of the decision
would be based on the likelihood that the preamble would chill the flourishing of positions
around the question of the fetus’s moral status.
196. Interestingly, one can trace back to Casey the Court’s concern in Carhart with the
psychological consequences of abortion, and the possibility that a woman may come to
regret her decision to abort. In upholding the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s informed
consent requirements, the Casey plurality wrote, "In attempting to ensure that a woman
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of
reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). Indeed, one may trace the
Court’s concern with the psychological consequences of abortion all the way back to Roe,
when Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion showed concern about the psychological
consequences to the woman of not being able to procure an abortion. He wrote:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life
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women "information about medical assistance for childbirth, information
about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide
adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion"197 does not have a
singular moral effect. While such information may dissuade some women
from terminating their pregnancies, this effect would not be due to the state
having compelled the woman to accept its moral view of the fetus; the
effect would be due to women being informed of options that they did not
know they had—an effect that is completely independent of any moral
suasion regarding the fetus. In truth, the informed consent requirements
would be more accurate if, in addition to notifying women about the
availability of state assistance if they carry their fetuses to term, they also
notified women about the diminishment of privacy rights that they could
expect if they came to rely upon public assistance, as well as the wholesale
problematization of mothers who rely on public assistance within cultural

and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress . . . associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Commenting on this paragraph, one scholar has
noted, "While couched in the terms of justifying women’s ability to choose whether or not to
have children, the psychological rationale expressed here is later employed to justify the
opposite end." Ivey, supra note 36, at 1478.
Scholars have observed that while Casey understood the possibility that women would
come to regret an abortion decision that was not fully informed as a reason to provide
information to them, Carhart understands this same possibility as a reason to take the
abortion decision out of their hands completely. See Dresser, supra note 63, at 1608–09 ("In
Casey, the woman’s potential regret justified making available to her supplementary
information about abortion and her other options, but in Gonzales, it justified removing the
abortion choice altogether."). Dresser goes on to summarize the jurisprudence concerning
the informational obligations of the state as follows:
The Supreme Court has gone from saying that the government may not require,
as part of informed consent, information that is designed to discourage the
abortion choice, to saying that the government may require such material so that
women will make ‘mature and informed’ decisions and will be protected from
later regret, to saying that the government may simply eliminate an abortion
choice so that women are protected both from anxiety that adequate information
could provoke and from the regret that could come if later they were to learn
that information.
Id. at 1617; see also Ivey, supra note 36, at 1469 ("While Roe emphasizes the importance of
women’s reproductive privacy and health, and Casey recognizes [a] women’s ‘ability to
control their reproductive lives,’ Gonzales . . . suggests . . . women, while they retain the
abortion right, must be protected from some of what the right confers upon them.").
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
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discourses.198 Nevertheless, the absence of this important, entirely truthful
information does not threaten the constitutionality of the statute as is.
Moreover, mandatory twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour waiting periods
do not have the effect of producing meaning regarding the moral status of the
fetus. Accordingly, the morally agnostic undue burden standard would not be
capable of striking down such a statute on the grounds that it contracts the
space of moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion right. However,
a Court reviewing such a law need not look to the effects that the law has on a
woman’s freedom to contemplate her fetus’s moral status in order to find a
mandatory waiting period constitutionally infirm; rather, the Court need only
look to the actual effects that such laws have on the women that they impact.
That is, while a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period might not be a
"substantial obstacle" for the nonpoor woman living in Manhattan, it might
effectively preclude the availability of a legal abortion for the poor woman
living in rural South Dakota;199 indeed, a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting
period might be an absolute obstacle to the poor woman who has only one day
off from work, or only enough money to cover the cost of one round-trip bus
ticket.200 Which is to argue: Although the morally agnostic undue burden
standard will strike down laws because they impose a moral position on
women, it does not preclude the standard from also striking down laws because
they have the effect of imposing a "substantial obstacle" on some, although not
all, women.201
198. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Pregnancy, Medicaid, State Regulation, and the
Production of Unruly Bodies, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 62 (2008) (explaining the author of
this Article’s view).
199. See Metzger, supra note 116, at 2038 ("Yet regulations that are not burdensome in
Pennsylvania may well be burdensome in other states where there are fewer abortion
providers or a more rural and poorer population[,] . . . [t]hus some women may be denied
effective exercise of their constitutional right to choose abortion.").
200. Metzger makes an interesting argument that the undue burden standard should
utilize the analysis used for content-neutral, traditional forum speech in First Amendment
cases, which requires a consideration of how the restriction on speech would affect less
wealthy individuals and groups. See id. at 2067 ("[I]t appears that the alternative channels
inquiry continues to involve a focus on the impact of a regulation on people with few
resources."). Metzger argues that if this consideration were reflected in the undue burden
standard, it would render unconstitutional regulations that function to increase the cost of
abortion, making the procedure economically unavailable to poorer women. Id. at 2068
("The Court would determine whether increased costs are slight or substantial explicitly
from this perspective. If the Court found that a regulation would result in a significant
increase in the cost of an abortion, the regulation would be struck down for imposing an
undue burden.").
201. There may be much gained from an undue burden standard that takes into
consideration differing subject positions, thereby enabling it to ask not just if a regulation
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V. Some Concluding Thoughts

The Supreme Court, in its recent abortion jurisprudence, is proceeding
from the assumption that the fetus is/has a morally significant "life." This
conception of the fetus corrupts the undue burden standard and, consequently,
overdetermines the questions posed by that standard; moreover, it also
overdetermines the answers to those questions. I have proposed replacing the
present, morally committed undue burden standard with an agnostic version
that assumes the radical and fundamental unknowability of the ontological
status of the fetus. This reformulation of the undue burden standard will enable
the Court to ask different questions about abortion regulations—questions
which do not invite only one set of answers.
A critic may argue that, while it is arbitrary to privilege the position that
the fetus is/has a "life" over an agnostic view of the fetus in abortion
jurisprudence, it is equally arbitrary to privilege a position of agnosticism over
one of fetal "life." Further, faced with arbitrariness without regard to which
position one privileges, we make no mistakes by maintaining the status quo.
My response is that, while the privileging of either position may be arbitrary,
one accords better with the stories that we like to tell about this nation.
Moreover, the position that is more congruent with our vision of this country is
an agnosticism towards fetal life.
That the state has the power within its far-reaching police power to
regulate things that touch on the morality of its citizenry, in order to protect the
moral welfare of is subjects, is a proposition that is still accepted. However,
history teaches that states ought to proceed with caution when attempting to
construct or protect the moral soundness of the people; the propriety of moral
positions is highly contentious and is subject to the vicissitudes of time and
experience. Moreover, those periods in which the state forces its moral
judgment upon large segments of the population that do not share its moral
commitments tend to be looked back upon, always in retrospect, as unfortunate
times in this nation’s history. And so, that period in which the state undertook
imposes an undue burden, but also to whom might a regulation impose an undue burden. See
Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84
MINN. L. REV. 673, 686 (1999) (noting that "[o]utgroup scholars, when confronted with the
same event, were more likely to recognize the existence of multiple truths"). This undue
burden standard would not unwittingly, yet invariably, reiterate the marginalization of some
classes (and, disproportionately, races) of women, as it would take into account the
multiplicity of subject positions within society. As such, this undue burden standard would
"better suit[] the contemporary ‘complexity of human society’ than a constitutional
jurisprudence based on categorically defined rights, with violations invariably subject to
rigorous review." Appleton, supra note 99, at 61.
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to protect its subjects from the "immorality" of alcohol consumption by
compelling temperance is looked at, in retrospect, as unfortunate—a
demonstration of moral righteousness that ultimately revealed itself as moral
folly.202 Similarly, those periods in which the state undertook to protect its
subjects from the "immorality" of nonmarital sex is looked at, in retrospect, as
unfortunate—a demonstration of a fascistic moral zealousness. And I am
hopeful that the time will come when that period of time in which the state
endeavored to protect its subjects from "homosexuals" and "homosexuality"
can be looked at, in retrospect, as unfortunate—a demonstration of moral
righteousness that ultimately revealed itself to be, simply put, wrong.203
Further, the privileging in constitutional law of moral agnosticism over
fetal "life" is consistent with the moral and theological positions regarding fetal
"life" held by judges and Justices who may, personally, believe that "life"
begins at conception and the fetus and the life it possesses is always already
valuable; accordingly, judges and Justices who are themselves convinced of the
existence and value of fetal "life" may, nevertheless, utilize the morally
agnostic undue burden standard to invalidate regulations that their personal
beliefs may lead them to find desirable, if not required. This reconciliation
between warring worldviews occurs because the agnostic undue burden
standard is an institutional requirement that must be employed by the actors
occupying the institutional role; accordingly, the men and women assuming
judicial positions are required to bracket their own personal beliefs when
performing the duties pursuant to that role.204 That is, it is illegitimate for the
law and its enactors to take cognizance of certain convictions, beliefs, and/or
theories. The belief—indeed, the faith—that the fetus is an always already
202. In truth, Prohibition was likely justified on the grounds of the state’s interest in
protecting public morality as well as public health. See Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1245
("[T]he Court’s older cases frequently sustained alcohol-related restrictions in the interests
of the public health and morality."); id. at 1262 ("[A]s much as those . . . cases dramatize . . .
moral threat[s] posed by alcohol, the Court never [relied on] the morality concern . . . alone;
rather, risks to the public health and other secondary effects associated with alcohol
consumption, such as crime, loomed at least as large as . . . moral decline.").
203. Here, I reference the fact that the right of gay and lesbian persons to marry their
partners has continued to be denied on both the federal and state levels. However,
Lawrence’s holding that it is unconstitutional for the state to criminalize the sexual acts of
gay and lesbian persons is, undeniably, a welcome step in the direction of ridding the nation
of state-enforced morality. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
204. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Some of
us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that
cannot control our decision[;] [o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.").
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valuable "life" is one of those illegitimate beliefs that has no place in law.
Consider on this point Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy,
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So,
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is
the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.205

In his dissent, Justice Harlan essentially argues that the White race is
superior to the Black race. Judges can be convinced of it; it can be a conviction
that no amount of evidence can disprove for them. Indeed, Harlan appears to
believe that as long as the White race "remains true to its great heritage and
holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty," it will maintain its
superiority over all other races. However, Justice Harlan was also equally
convinced that the White race cannot use the law as a means to facilitate its
superiority. Analogously, many of those opposed to an abortion right may
believe that the fetus has/is a "life." Judges can be convinced of the fact of fetal
"life"; it can be a conviction that the image of the fetus serves to simply
reiterate as truth for them. Indeed, Justice Kennedy appears to believe the
simple, elegant fact of fetal "life"; it is such a truism that he can state, without
citations, that the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 proscribes a particular
manner of ending fetal life—with no indications that some believe "life" to be
an overdetermined, yet vapid word that describes too much, yet not enough,
whenever it is evoked. Surely, Kennedy is not the only Justice who presently
sits on the Supreme Court who subscribes to the theory of fetal "life." But, as
institutional actors, it is illegitimate for them to take cognizance of this theory
when they are performing their institutional role. That is, if the "White race"
could not use the law as a means to facilitating the end of White supremacy,
believers in fetal "life," similarly, cannot use the law as a means to facilitating
the end of reiterating their particular theory of fetal moral ontology.

205. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is, of
course, much more to say about Carhart, race, and racial justice. I will, indeed, say much
more in future scholarship.

